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PREFACE
Our subject is the behavior of man, not of some 
imaginary "ideal" man or of some equally hypothetical 
and non-existent "average" man, but of man as he really 
lives and acts, with all his weaknesses and limitations.
It is these real actions of real men which are the 
relevant subject matter of economic inquiry which has 
as its aim the comprehension of human action. In this 
sense, we seek in this study to establish what investing 
persons are about. Herein we envisage a system which, 
perhaps with unbecoming immodesty, purports to describe 
the behavior of men as they engage in the processes of 
appraising, evaluating and selecting among alternative 
security investments.
As always, what we have written and rewritten with 
such pains is, in retrospect, less than perfect, even to 
our biased eyes. There comes a time, however, when one 
must stop revising and conclude, for now. But one hopes 
that such readers as one has will recognize that one's 
conclusions are "for now," that what one says is tentative, 
and that one's most recent position, however positively 
stated, need not be one's permanent position, that in the 
final analysis, only change is permanent.
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Also, in retrospect one must be Impressed by the 
extent to which he has been influenced by friends and 
mentors, near and far. In our case this must be especially 
so, for we have held throughout that whatever "fields" of 
knowledge may exist, boundaries do not; that disciplines 
are mere adjuncts to the division of academic labor. Our 
intention has been to take what is for us a "world-view" 
and to draw together the behavioral foundations of invest­
ment decision-making by individuals. Our indebtedness is 
accordingly considerable and diffuse. Where our thoughts 
have definite and traceable origins, we have endeavored 
to acknowledge our indebtedness directly, and in many cases 
we have found it desirable to support our arguments with 
the statements of others. In such cases we have endeavored 
to ensure that the reported views are authoritative ones 
and that they have not been misconstrued, though we must 
admit the possibility remains.
Finally, we have many personal friends from contact 
with whom we have benefitted and to whom we are indebted. 
Any attempt to pay specific tribute would, however, be 
incomplete and therefore inappropriate. Also, our 
permanent committee, consisting of Professors 
Donald E. Vaughn (Chairman), William J. Stober,
P. Francis Boyer, Edmund R. Gray, and Lloyd F. Morrison, 
read and commented incisively upon prior drafts and the 
completed dissertation. To each of these is expressed our 
sincere appreciation. Let it be noted, however, that our
ill
use of the first person plural throughout is entirely 
stylistic. In every case the interpretations and 
final Judgments have been our own. We acknowledge our 
indebtedness to all, but we alone accept responsibility 
for any errors of omission or commission.
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ABSTRACT
We seek in this study a comprehension of what 
investing persons are about. In particular, we outline 
a broad theoretical system which purports to describe the 
behavior of real men as they engage in the processes of 
appraising, evaluating, and selecting among alternative 
security investments.
We argue:
(1) At any time the individual Investor has a 
fixed stock of (net) cashable (Invested and Investible) 
wealth.
(2) The investment opportunities of persons are 
represented by risky securities and (practically) riskless 
(money-wise) cash.
(3) The investment choices of persons are made in a 
given present in respect of an uncertain future.
(4) All knowledge of the future and, therefore, of 
the future consequences of investment choices is held with 
only a greater or lesser degree of probability.
(5) Investment choice and action are individual and 
here and now, involving appraisement, the anticipation of 
the expected consequences of available alternative invest­
ments, and valuation, the preference of an individual
viii
Investor for the appraised consequences of alternatives.
(6) The investment decisions of persons are made 
relevant to some (short) period of time, or "investment 
horizon."
(7) The (net) ex post monetary gain or loss on an 
investment is the (net) market price of the investment at 
the end of the investment horizon plus (net) periodical 
income (if any) from the investment over the horizon 
minus the (gross) purchase price of the investment.
(8) The subjective expectations (appraisements) of 
persons concerning the (net) income and capital gain 
prospects of alternative investments subsist as 
n-parameter (subjective) probability distributions over 
envisioned possible future events, ex ante monetary gains 
and losses on alternative Investments over specified 
investment periods.
(9) The individual investor entertains probabilistic 
appraisements for a finite set of alternative investments.
(10) The Individual investor’s utility of wealth 
function is generally of the form specified by Friedman- 
Savage and modified by Markowitz: concave (from below) for 
a relevant range of losses in wealth, convex over some 
relevant range of gains in wealth, then concave again, but 
bounded in the extremes.
(11) The investor selects among alternative invest­




(i) The investment valuations of individuals are 
determined as preferences for strictly limited commitments 
in particular securities at current (or appraised) prices. 
The private inclinations of Investors to action in respect 
of a security (to buy, to sell, or to hold specific 
quantities at specific prices) then have effect in the 
market. They collectively determine between more or less 
narrow margins the price and quantity of each (dated) 
market transaction.
(ii) The market prices of securities derive from the 
interaction of the subjective judgments of all participants 
in the market and are objective measurements. They measure 
at a given time and place the number of monetary units 
which could have been substituted for a given quantity of 
securities, and vice-versa. (Dated) prices and trans­
action volume alone constitute the corroborative data 
of securities markets and require to be regarded as the 
output of a "black boy."
(ill) The Inputs of the securities markets are 
informational stimuli only variously received and 
vicariously interpreted. Important inputs through time 
of such markets are their output data: the past and 
present prices of securities as indications of future 
prices, as objective criteria by which the effectiveness 
of past investment choices may be Judged, and by reference 
to which investors may ascertain the current monetary
x
equivalents of their portfolios as indications of their 
present capacities for action.
(iv) The market in securities is a viable social 
system; security prices are social phenomena. The market 
for any security with its price mechanism is a homeostatic 
system. The forces determining the state of the market at 
any moment are entirely the value Judgments of rational 
persons, based always upon the most current expectations 
and valuations of all investing persons.
xl
CHAPTER I
UNCERTAINTY, INFORMATION AND INVESTMENT
1. Introduction 
The choice to hold assets, or stocks of things 
with exchange value, is the obverse of the choice to con­
sume, since a person who holds valuable assets can always 
(choose to) consume them directly or sell them and commit 
the proceeds to consumption. The economic choices of an 
individual concern the allocation of his wealth, measured 
by the cash value of the assets he holds, between con-
^"The significant concept and measure of wealth in 
a market economy is the monetary equivalent, or the sum 
of money prices if sold of all severable things owned.” 
Raymond J. Chambers, Accounting, Evaluation and Economic 
Behavior (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 
1^66), p. 70. Considered in this way, the concept of 
wealth excludes any measure of the skills and potenti­
al! tie s“emBo3Ted in persons. At any point of time these 
have not been delivered and may never be delivered. It 
is acknowledged that the sale of personal services in the 
market represents the major source of personal Income 
from which wealth may be accumulated. But "the market 
ordinarily does not buy a man's potential; it buys his 
services, as his potential becomes an actuality." Ibid., 
p. 10Jf. Such a conception of wealth also rejects tRe 
(mistaken) idea that persons can spend their future 
incomes. This notion postulates an impossibility and 
cannot be accepted. People can (and do) borrow money 
on the security of their future earnings, but selling 
a claim based on one's earning capacity is fundamentally 
like selling any other asset or claim against an asset. 
The saleability of mortgages and IOU's generally requires 
a market. The constraint on one's capacity to act 
financed by the sale of IOU's is to be found in the
1
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sumption spending and the holding of assets through 
time. For simplicity and consistent with the Keynesian 
view that consumption spending is financed out of current 
Income, we consider the acquisition of assets intended 
for consumption as tantamount to the act of consumption
and regard the asset holdings of persons as holdings of
2 3risky securities and riskless cash.-'
market for debts, where the prices of such assets are 
established. See Samuel B. Chase, Asset Prices in 
Economic Analysis (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University 
of California Press, 1963)* pp. 4-7.
^We define securities broadly to include stocks, 
bonds, notes, and perhaps most commonly, deeds to real 
property and chattels. "Conceived in its larger sense, 
investment includes a far broader field than the layman 
supposes. It is less of stocks and bonds, and more of 
land, buildings, insurance policies and annuities; it is 
less of accounting statistics and more of economic prin­
ciples." Floyd F. Burtchett, Investments and Investment 
Policy (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, l£3B), P» 5* 
’’Depending on his own status, needs and tastes, the thing 
purchased as an investment may be marketable securities, 
life insurance, savings deposits, other titles or claims, 
Including land, or blocks of producers* goods or other 
commodities; may be either newly created or long in 
existence; and may constitute either a net expansion of 
his investment assets or merely a replacement of other 
assets previously held. From the individual*s point of 
view, all are ‘investment.*" James W. Angell, "Uncertainty, 
Likelihoods and Investment Decisions," Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, LXXIV, No. 1 (February, I960), Solely for 
convenience, we shall usually refer to the investments of 
persons as (long or short) commitments in the securities 
of firms. The analysis is, however, quite general.
-'The risklessness of cash holdings to which we refer 
is in respect of the number of units of cash held. The 
implication intended is that so many monetary units today 
will be the same number of monetary units tomorrow. This 
concept of risklessness in money terms is to be distin­
guished clearly from the risk of loss due to changes in 
the purchasing power of money, i.e., in real terms. For 
simplicity, we regard holdings of cash, near-money assets 
(e.g., deposits in insured savings accounts), and (actual
Accordingly, the investment decisions of persons
involve the allocation of an individual's cashable wealth
among alternative securities with different (and uncertain)
income and capital gain prospects and investment holdings
Aof riskless cash. We speak of the securities and specu­
lative cash holdings of a person as his Investment port­
folio and of the process by which he makes asset choices 
as portfolio selection. In this dissertation we investi­
gate the way in which individuals appraise, evaluate and 
choose among alternative security investments and thereby 
determine the market prices of securities.
2. Uncertainty, Appraisement and Valuation 
It is customary to speak of the investment decisions 
of persons as examples of decision-making under uncertainty. 
Nonetheless, as uncertainty Implies a general incomplete­
ness of knowledge, it is in fact a condition of action 
generally,^ for it will be clear that choice and action
or guaranteed) obligations of the government and its 
agencies as money holdings and riskless in money terms.
LInvestment, or "speculative,” holdings of cash 
denote money balances in excess of those balances neces­
sary to consumption transactions. The speculative 
balances of persons will include, therefore, money held 
as a precaution against the unforeseen and in the antici­
pation of changes in the rate at which money can be 
exchanged for other assets, including securities. On the 
incentives to hold money and liquidity preference, see 
John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment. 
Interest and Money (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1942), Chps. 13 and 1^.
'’"The uncertainty of the future is already implied 
in the very notion of action. That man acts and that the
(investment and otherwise) are characteristically present 
processes.^ One decides and acts in the here and now, 
but the consequences (intended and otherwise) of action 
are characteristically future and the evaluation of the 
effectiveness of action is characteristically past. 
Alternatively stated, the process of choice, itself 
present, represents the selection of a specific course 
of action having future consequences; and, though one 
may know much about the present and the past considered 
relevant for the future, (clairvoyants notwithstanding) 
one may know nothing with certainty about the future. 
Antecedent to the valuation and selection of any specific 
action, if the choice among alternatives is to be other 
than random, an actor will require to appraise the 
expected future consequences of alternative courses of 
action.
Though the two are closely related, the process 
of appraisement is to be distinguished in important 
respects from that of valuation. Appraisement in no 
way depends upon the preferences and values of the
future is uncertain are by no means two independent 
matters. They are only two different modes of establishing 
the same thing." Ludwig von Mises, Human Action (3d rev. 
ed.; Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1966), p. 105.
^"Valuation is an essentially’present*process arising 
out of the opinions, beliefs and sentiments of the owners 
of physical capital (including money) operating on the 
various forms of physical capital actually in existence 
at the moment of valuation." Kenneth E. Boulding,
A Reconstruction of Economics (New York: John Wiley &
Sons, Inc., 1950), p.
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appraising individual. Appraisement denotes the antici­
pation of an expected fact: a future dividend or interest 
payment or a future market price, for example. Valuation, 
on the other hand, subsists in the preferences of an 
individual for the appraised future consequences of 
alternative actions. Valuation, while a necessary part 
of reasoned choice, is therefore always subjective and 
entirely personal; it is expressive of an order of 
preference and not of measure. It ranks or arranges
in a scale of degrees which knows only the ordinal 
7numbers.1
It will be quite clear that valuation as a process 
is directed towards the future. What we evaluate is 
always the expected, "a state of affairs to be brought 
into existence, never a thing or state of affairs which
Onow exists." Value is attributed to the non-existent,
onever to the existent. Moreover, valuation's are
?von Mises, ojo. clt., p. 97; "Every valuation is a 
comparison; we have no conception of an absolute utility 
or an absolute standard of utility. The notion of value 
is meaningless except in relation to alternatives of 
choice." Prank H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 19^0), p. 63; "The 
predication of 'goodness' may be simply positive, but 
the predication of value (valuation) must always be 
comparative, x is 'good'; but x has 'more (or less) or 
higher (or lower) value' than jr." W. D. Lamont, The 
Value Judgment (Edinburgh: The Edinburgh University Press,19357, P. 59.
8Ibib., p. 60.
9"If I have a stock of wood sufficient to make a 
bookcase or a table, but not both, the choice is between 
non-existents, the potential bookcase and the potential
6
transient. They are conceived by a given Individual at
a given time and in a given action situation, and the
10 11environment of action is flux. *
3. The Meaning of Probability 
Because the future is uncertain, it is incontro­
vertible that all knowledge about the future consequences
of actions is held with only a greater or lesser degree
12of probability, never with certainty. The view we
table. If I have an actually existing table, and am con­
sidering whether to make a bookcase out of it, the things 
evaluated against each other are not an existing table 
and a potential bookcase, but the potential continuance 
of the table and the creation of the bookcase— again two 
non-existents.... When we consider carefully what it is 
that we are evaluating, we find that what we place in the 
valuational order, the alternatives between which we 
choose, are potential states of affairs...and not actual 
existents." Ibid., p. 6l.
■^"...valuations are always temporal. Any valuation 
is limited in time and context; it is made by a person in 
a given state, at a given time, and in a given environment. 
A valuation is an incident in a continuing stream of 
experiences and actions. It has no permanence; it may 
never recur.*' Chambers, 0£. cit., p. 42.
H-The several senses in which the terms "valuation” 
and "value" are used commonly has caused us some diffi­
culty. We use "valuation" generally and "value" 
occasionally in the ordinal, subjective sense Just 
specified. Value used in this sense is not to be con­
fused with mathematical or monetary value; valuation, 
not with economic calculation in terms of money. We 
shall have occasion to avail ourselves of the latter 
uses presently. The sense intended will be apparent 
from the context; however, when it is appropriate we may 
include a qualifying word. For example, when the former 
sense is implied, we may refer to "subjective value;" 
when the latter, "monetary value."
1?‘•This is so even in the case of physical phenomena. 
Thus, "no one observing a book lying on a desk would 
expect to see it fly up to the ceiling as it experienced
7
adopt of probability is a world-view which regards a
proposition as necessarily "probable" if our knowledge
13concerning its content is less than perfect. We are 
therefore not able to acknowledge the proposition as 
either true or not true. But we do have some knowledge 
concerning the content of the proposition. We lack 
perfect knowledge, but neither are we perfectly Ignorant 
about it.
Accordingly, we enumerate two entirely different
instances of probability: class (or frequency) probability
Inl­and case (or subjective) probability. Class probability
means: We know, or assume to know, with regard to the
situation concerned, everything about a class of events
or phenomena; we know, or assume to know, on the basis of
repetitive performances of an experiment on different but
a sudden chill. Yet it is not impossible to imagine a 
situation in which all the molecules in the book moved 
spontaneously in a given direction. Such a situation is 
only extremely Improbable, since there are so many 
molecules in any macroscopic portion of matter."
Walter J. Moore, Physical Chemistry (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1955)» P» 1^5* see also Edward Kasner 
and James R. Newman, "New Names for Old," The World of 
Mathematics, III (ed. James R. Newman; New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1956), pp. 1996-2010.
13'*The problem of probable Inference is much bigger 
than those problems which constitute the field of the 
calculus of probability. Only preoccupation with the 
mathematical treatment could result in the prejudice that 
probability always means frequency." von Mises, op. cit., 
p. 107.
^The designations class and case are due to von Mises, 
ibid., pp. 106-115. The concept of case probability has 
been variously discussed as "personal probability," "sub­
jective probability," "psychological probability," "degree 
of conviction," "degree of belief," and "probability belief."
comparable persons or things, the relative frequency 
of each outcome; but about an actual, singular experi­
ment or event we know nothing but that it is an element 
of a class. Mortality tables, as an example, purport 
to tell us everything about the mortality of the whole 
population in question. But they can tell us nothing 
about the life expectancy of any single member of this 
class of people. The characteristic feature of insurors 
and casinos is that they deal with a whole class of 
events. As they pretend to know everything about the 
behavior of a whole class of events they are able to 
establish premiums and odds which preclude any specific 
risk in the conduct of their business.1^
In contrast to class probability, case probability 
means: In respect of a particular event, we know some of 
the factors conditioning its outcome; but there are, or 
may be, other determining factors about which we know 
nothing. It is this category of probability which has 
relevance in problems of human action where any reference 
to frequency is inappropriate because our statements 
always deal with unique events which are not members of
*5gome writers would restrict the use of the term 
"risk" to situations of this sort. "To qualify as a 
risk situation...an experiment must be repetitive in 
nature and must possess a frequency distribution from 
which observations can be drawn and about which Inferences 
can be made by objective, statistical procedures."
Donald E. Farrar, The Investment Decision Under 
Uncertainty (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1962;, p. 2; see also Knight, 0£. cit. We make 
no such restriction.
9
16any class. Case probabilities arise from the knowledge
and experience of the individual and exist essentially as
17"wagers” about the future. ' Hence, individuals enter­
tain for unique events statements of the following kind:
(a) I will bet five to one that Corporation
W reports a loss for the current quarter;
(b) It is my guess that the earnings of 
Corporation X will grow at an annual 
rate of twenty percent over the next five 
years;
(c) I estimate the chances of Corporation Y 
common selling at 40, 45, or 50 six months 
from now at two-fifths, one-fifth, and 
two-fifths, respectively; and
^•^"Uncertainty... is said to be present when the 
experiment in question cannot be carefully replicated by 
(or upon) other persons or at other times or places; that 
is, when the situation is unique. Its frequency distribu­
tion, therefore, cannot be objectively specified. This is 
undoubtedly the setting in which most Investment decisions 
take place." Farrar, loc. clt.; "No two acts of invest­
ment sire or can be completely identical; each is unique. 
Even when the external form of successive investments is 
much the same, as in replacing standard types of inventory 
or in making successive purchases of bonds of the same 
issue, the surrounding general economic conditions and 
prospects are never twice alike, at least in a private 
enterprise economy." Angell, o£. clt., p. 4.
■̂7"Any statement concerning the future is uttered in 
the sense of a wager.... It is the desire for action which 
necessitates this gambling. The passive man might sit and 
wait for what will happen. The active man who wants to 
determine his own future...is obliged to be a gambler 
because logic offers him no better way to deal with the 
future." Hans Relchenbach, Experience and Prediction 
(Chicago: The University of dhlcago Press, i96i),
PP. 315-316.
10
(d) I am certain that Corporation Z (say,
General Motors) will not pass its next 
quarterly preferred dividend.
Each of these statements is an example of case probability 
as a means by which persons conceptualize the uncertainty 
of the future, a means by which persons deal with unique 
and individual actions and events. Each is a subjective 
judgment expressing personal conviction, nothing more and 
nothing less. In this respect, statement (d) deserves 
additional consideration as an apparent contradiction to 
the previously argued inevitable uncertainty of the future. 
The apparent contradiction arises from the fact that state­
ment (d) is an Inexact expression of opinion. The person 
making such a statement would undoubtedly admit, under 
question, that, he is less certain that Corporation Z will 
not pass its preferred dividend than he is that the sun 
will rise tomorrow. A more exact formulation would have
been: I personally am convinced that Corporation Z will
18not pass its next quarterly preferred dividend.
4. The 'Investment Horizon'
We may expect general assent to the proposition 
that business firms and the securities of firms differ in 
their basic characters and, because the future is uncer­
tain, in their potentials. Different securities involve 
different rights and claims; different firms produce
1 ftvon Mises, 0£. cit., pp. 106-115.
11
different products and services with varlng degrees of
effectiveness and efficiency. Prom the point of view of
the investor, however, what is produced by investments in
the securities of firms is money: dividends, interest
payments, and gains on the maturity or sale of securities.
Investors therefore do not prefer an investment in a
supermarket to an investment in an aerospace firm on the
basis that food is "more important" than air travel or
the exploration of space, or on any other non-financial
ground. Each investor may take into account the different
characteristics of the several classes of securities (and
firms), but only for the purpose of discovering that class,
or within a class of securities, for discovering that firm
19which is expected to best serve his investment ends.
Because what is produced by investments’ of persons 
in the securities of firms is money at future times and 
because the potential of any investment to produce money 
over an uncertain future is capable only of appraisement, 
an investor’s valuation of a security will depend upon 
his structure of preferences for the appraised prospects 
of alternative investments. Investment valuation will 
require therefore that he appraise with reasonable
■^Chambers, o£. clt., p. 279; "Some economic institu­
tions (and some classes of firms) appeal to one [investor], 
some to the other. There is a fair presumption that holders 
of American Telephone and Telegraph shares and of British 
investment trusts are looking for security and want con­
servative administration; while holders of American invest­
ment trusts and mining shares want 'a run for their money.*" 
A.G. Hart, Anticipations, Uncertainty, and Dynamic Planning 
(Chicago: The University of* tihicago Press, 19^0), p. 73*
12
precision the expected, monetary consequences of commit­
ments of his wealth to alternative Investments. Further­
more, because the investment commitments of persons in the 
securities of firms are revocable, investing persons will 
ordinarily structure their expectations of the potentials 
of alternative investment commitments over some more or
less specified period of time. In the commonplace this
20period is termed the rtinvestment horizon." Now, the 
choice of any particular investment horizon is made in 
respect of personal investment ends and in the contem­
plation of an uncertain future. But because the ends of 
persons are transient and the environment is fluid and 
because the reliable bases of reasoned expectations
become more and more vague as one conceives of the farther
?1distant future, persons contemplating commitments of 
funds to investment securities will, in general, envision
2®J. Tinbergen, "The Notions of Horizon and Expect­
ancy in Dynamic Economics," Econometrica, I (July, 1932), 2^7-264.
21"...given knowledge of the present structure or 
state of the environment, an expectation in respect of any 
time in the immediate future is more dependable than an 
expectation in respect of distant future time." Chambers, 
op. clt., p. 62; "Investment based on genuine long-term 
expectation is so difficult today as to be scarcely prac­
ticable.... It needs more intelligence to defeat the 
forces of time and our ignorance of the future than to 
beat the gun." Keynes, cm. clt., p. 157* "...detailed 
estimation and planning for dates beyond the very nearest 
future is likely to be wasted effort. Even the course of 
events considered 'most probable* will almost certainly 
diverge so from reality that all details of plans based 
on it will have to be re-worked. It is better economy 
to lay out only the broad outlines of estimates and plans 
for the distant future...." Hart, oj>. clt., p. 82.
13
a relatively short expectancy horizon and will frequently 
re-evaluate their various investment commitments in the 
light of new information and (perhaps) new expectations
It may be objected that persons are observed to
maintain specific investment commitments over substantial
periods of time. This observation is, however, entirely
consistent with the above conclusion. We do not require
that the investment holdings of persons be liquidated
periodically. We conclude merely that these holdings
require periodical cognizance, however casual. Now, one
may, on such occasions, decide to retain, to increase, or
to liquidate a position. A series of short-term "retain”
decisions in respect of some commitment then represents
to an observer a "long-term" or "permanent" investment;
but, clearly, to hold a security over time and through
changing conditions is to choose to do so, at least 
23periodically.
horizo: w _ an absolute limit to
his vision. Rather, there is a haze which obscures things 
more and more as they become more remote, but through 
which the larger features of the distant landscape can 
yet be made out...." Hart, loc. clt.
23"por to do nothing and to be idle are also action, 
they too determine the course of events. Wherever the 
conditions for human interference are present, man acts no 
matter whether he interferes or refrains from interfering. 
He who endures what he could change acts no less than he 
who interferes in order to attain another result." 
von Mises, 0£. clt., p. 13; "Adaptation is action here and 
now. A state of adaptation in the long run is the conse­
quence perhaps of a series of actions taken at various
and ends 22
YV his ‘economic
5. Economic Calculation, Expectations 
and Investment 
Generally, then, when a man purchases a security 
he buys the right to a series of future monetary returns; 
in particular, he buys a claim to the future dividend or 
interest payments to the security and to the proceeds of 
its eventual sale or maturity. As to the amounts and 
timings of such future monetary returns he can only spec­
ulate on the basis of his limited current knowledge and 
(subjective) beliefs and expectations. And it is beyond 
argument that the propositions one may develop about 
future conditions and events are always and inevitably 
hypotheticals. One may use past experience and present 
knowledge of facts and relationships in making calculations 
and in forming propositions about the future, but those 
propositions are beliefs or expectations only. In 
arriving at forecasts or estimates about the future, one 
may employ current conditions and the direction in which, 
and the rate at which, conditions have changed in the past. 
One may take into account also the extent to which observed 
trends are expected to be modified in the future. But 
trends and relationships are observed to change, and their
moments of time. But every such action is taken in the 
context of a specific here and now." Chambers, 0£. clt., 
p. 205; "There ain’t [sic] no such animal as a permanent 
investment." Bernard M. Baruch, quoted in How to Invest 
(New York: Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smi'thT inc., 
196*), p. 13.
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Implications for the future are matters of opinion and 
diverse interpretation.2^ This does not, of course, mean 
that calculations about the future are useless. They are 
in fact a necessary part of reasoned choice. But all that 
can result from them as inferences and expectations are 
individual and hypothetical.^5
Again, expectations of the future subsist in beliefs 
and opinions which coexist in the here and now with one’s 
conceptions and values generally and arise from delibera­
tion in the light of one’s knowledge and current condition. 
With one’s utility for variously uncertain prospects of 
money in various amounts and at various times, they com­
prise the criteria of investment valuation. But they are 
subjective and transient. They are an Incident in a con­
tinuing stream of consciousness, continually influenced 
by the diversity of forces to which an actor himself is
2^"In forecasting by extrapolation, unfortunately, 
there is no golden rule. Instead, we have three basic 
assumptions, which may be applied in an infinite number of 
combinations: (a) that the recent level of the variable 
under study will continue; (b) that the recent rate of 
change will continue— an assumption which admits of vari­
ants, as we may consider the significant rate of change to 
be either the rate of growth or the rate of acceleration, 
or some higher derivative; and (c) that the variable will 
tend toward some level thought of as ’normal.' These three 
assumptions, curiously and wonderfully mixed, lie at the 
root of most forecasts.... But while all three rules may 
agree as to the direction of the revision, they will not 
agree as to the distance it will extend into the future, 
or as to intensity." Hart, ojd. cit., p. 78.
25"Llfe, in fact, is an hypothecating process."
G. Patrick Meredith, "The Surprise Function and the Epis- 
temic Theory of Expectations." Expectations, Uncertainty, 
and Business Behavior (ed. Mary Jean Bowman; New York: 
Social Science Research Council, 1958), p. 75.
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subject. They are a product of his-perceptions.
6. Information and Investment 
As the future Is uncertain, It will be clear that 
the conscious choices of persons involving future conse­
quences will be predicated upon expectations. It will be 
clear, too, that the expectations of persons derive from 
the beliefs and interpretations of individual actors.
This remains so independent of whether one is about 
choosing the shortest distance between two points or 
appraising the price at which some stock will sell at some 
future date. The fact that geometry provides an undis­
puted answer in the first case and that no such answer 
is possible in the second case does not alter this prop­
osition. In either case the decision of an individual 
depends upon his state of mind or knowledge at the time. 
Expectation, therefore, is simply the current state of 
mind of a given individual with respect to an assertion,
a coming event, or any other matter on which absolute
26knowledge is unavailable. Since the environment in 
which man exists and acts is one of permanent change, 
an individual's knowledge and state of mind, and there­
fore his expectations, may be expected to continually 
alter as he receives and interprets new stimuli— messages, 
objects, and events newly apprehended. Not all of these
2^After De Morgan's definition of probability, 
quoted in Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, "The Nature of Expec­
tation and Uncertainty," ibid., p. 12.
stimuli will have definable effects upon the expectations 
of a recipient. We term the set of stimuli, among the 
many to which an actor is continually subject, which have 
the capacity to alter the expectations of an individual 
as information. But in respect of a given choice situa­
tion, information refers only to stimuli interpreted as 
bearing on the situation in which choice is to be exer­
cised, only to those messages relevant to choice.
Moreover, to be regarded as information, an object or 
statement is required to be more specific than a common­
place. To an investor who contemplates a commitment in 
IBM, the commonplace statement, "IBM produces computing 
machines," is not information.
Nov:, only if an actor is in doubt will he seek 
information. An actor who is already convinced, whose 
mind is made up, who does not wish to be "confused" by 
additional "facts," no longer entertains alternatives from 
which to choose. But an actor who envisions a set of 
alternative actions, the consequences of some or all of 
which he is unsure, experiences doubt. He lacks knowledge 
of at least some, and perhaps many, of the factors which 
will determine the outcomes of contemplated actions. The 
function of information is to increase the knowledge or to 
reduce the doubt of an actor concerning the alternatives 
available to him and the possible consequences of each.
But just as not all of the stimuli to which an investor 
is continually subject represent information to him,
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not all of those stimuli which represent information are 
equally informative. We define the information content 
of a message as its capacity to select responses in a 
recipient; that is to say, its capacity to modif; a 
recipient’s predisposition to act in some way.
But, to speak of the capacity of information to 
modify ah actor's predisposition to act Implies that he 
already has some predisposition. At any moment an 
Investor has some current knowledge and state of mind.
He knows in a general way his current investment ends and 
preferences; for Income and capital gains and for the 
assumption of risk, for example. He knows, on the basis 
of his current (and limited) knowledge and experience, his 
personal opinions and subjective expectations concerning 
the relative capacities of alternative securities and 
firms to serve those ends and preferences. Moreover, an 
investor knows the investment assets which currently 
comprise his cashable wealth, and he can, by reference to 
contemporary markets in those assets, ascertain the 
command over general purchasing power that they represent. 
But all of this knowing is tentative, the momentary 
resultant of his limited and changing knowledge and 
past experience. As useful as it may be to him, it is 
largely his property alone. He may relate it to others 
or he may not, but he may not expect the behavior of others 
to be influenced by it. He may, however, on the basis of 
his current state of mind, be regarded as having some
inclination to act, to select a portfolio of security 
investments. The capacity of information to modify an 
actor's predisposition to act refers to a modification of 
his predisposition based on current knowledge by virtue 
of the increased knowledge or reduced doubt information 
may Induce in a recipient. It is the function of 
investment (security) analysis to provide information 
relevant to the investment choices of persons, to 
facilitate their optimal investment choice and adaptation.
7. Glasses of Investment Information 
In respect of information bearing on investment 
choices, some ordering of messages is convenient to a 
consideration of their interpretation and utilization by 
investing persons. We therefore distinguish two broad 
classes of information: that which is independently 
ascertainable by investors and that which is supplied by
pQcorporations themselves.
First, consider that class of information independ­
ently ascertainable by investors. Such information is of 
the character of public knowledge which is, or which may 
be (perhaps at a price), the property of all men. At 
a general level, for example, all investors have or can 
have knowledge of the growth or decline of particular 
trades or industries. As these trends affect the interests 
of persons generally and the actions of governmental
^^Chambers, 0£. cit., Chp. 7. 28Ibld., p. 276.
authorities they are matters of diverse public comment.
Persons have or can have knowledge of relative and general
movements in the prices of commodities over time. They
have or can have knowledge of political, social, and
economic events thought to influence the fortunes of
particular trades and Industries; these, too, are public
k n o w l e d g e . But investors do not invest in economies,
trades, or Industries. To choose among the securities of
specific firms in selected trades or industries, they
will want to know something of the probabilities with
which an investment in a given firm may be expected to
produce money in alternative amounts at various times.
Still of the nature of public knowledge but at a more
specific level, investors have or can have knowledge of
the dividends and interest paid by, and of the market
30prices of, the securities of specific firms.
An individual investor may consider public knowledge, 
together with his knowledge and experience generally, as 
sufficient to the development of reasoned expectations 
of the investment potentials of alternative securities; 
for example, he may consider past and present dividends 
and securities prices and rates of change in dividends and
29"...the entrepreneur has available a great deal of 
evidence about broader market influences. General cyclical 
movements and tendencies in politics, in particular, are 
likely to be very important to him. That he studies such 
phenomena is abundantly plain from the content of news­
papers and magazines addressed to businessmen." Hart, 
op. cit., p. 79.
3°Chambers, o£. cit., p. 2??.
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prices sufficient indications of future dividends and 
prices.-*1 In the vernacular such persons are styled 
"market technicians." Other individuals, styled "funda­
mentalists," may consider public information as necessary 
though Insufficient to Informed expectations and choices. 
Such persons will want to know something of the relative 
capacities of specific firms to operate profitably and” 
efficiently. For this purpose they will employ financial 
tests of the past performances and present positions of 
alternative firms as indications of future potentials. 
Now, many factors contribute to the relative superiority
31There is, however, no "price illusion." Securi­
ties are legal claims to future money payments, generally 
of dividends, interest, and principal sums. That inves­
tors may, in their appraisements, anticipate security 
prices directly (e. g., on the basis of current or past 
prices, configurations of prices, or rates of change in 
prices) is a matter of evaluated convenience and suffi­
ciency, arising from the revocabllity of security invest­
ments. But price expectations are simply expectations of 
expectations of future money payments to securities. If 
no such money payments are expected (to be expected), 
there is no question of what price will be; there will 
be no price. "Like many other propositions in economics, 
the irrelevance of dividend policy, given investment 
policy, is ’obvious, once you think about it.* It is, 
after all, merely one more instance of the general 
principle that there are no ’financial illusions' in a 
rational and perfect economic environment. Values there 
are determined solely by 'real' considerations— in this 
case the earning power of the firm's assets and its 
investment policy— and not by how the fruits of the 
earning power are 'packaged* for distribution."
Merton H. Miller and Franco Modigliani, "Dividend Policy, 
Growth, and the Valuation of Shares," Journal of Business. 
XXXIV, No. k (October, 1961), ^1^; "...speculators as a 
class can profit only by trading with Investors, to 
whom they can sell only for income; therefore in the end 
all prices depend on someone's estimate of future income." 
John Burr Williams,0 The Theory of Investment Value 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard! University Press, 1938), p. 3.
of such measures as between specific firms. One firm 
may have a superior management, a superior location, or 
like advantages which contribute to its relative superi­
ority; another, superior sources of supply, a superior 
labor force, or other advantages. These differing 
superiorities may be expected to differentiate firms as 
to their potentials. However, none of these factors is 
capable of objective measurement; only their consequences 
are measured by financial tests: the capital structures 
of different firms, their financial positions and 
standings, and the periodical financial results of their 
operations through time. Fundamentalists, therefore, may 
be supposed to engage in retrospective calculations which 
utilize the reported financial data of specific corpora­
tions in the development of rates and ratios which 
purport to measure for specific firms, among other 
things: ^
(a) Growth of earnings and sales in the past;
(b) Past profitability;
Stability of past earnings;
(d) Dividend rate and record; and
Financial strength, or credit standing; 
as indications of the relative prospects of specific 
firms.
It is significant that the measurements which
32Adapted from Benjamin Graham, David L. Dodd, and 
Sidney Cottle, Security Analysis (4th ed.; New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1962), p. 231.
provide the bases of such indications can only be 
obtained from the vouchsafed financial statements of 
firms. Information of these specific kinds is of the 
class supplied by corporations themselves in the satis­
faction of a quid pro quo arising from the privilege of 
corporations to invite the financial support of the 
public. This particular dependence of investing persons 
upon information of the class supplied by firms themselves 
deserves additional consideration. Mow, an investor in 
the securities of corporate firms, unlike the buyer of a 
physical_cpmmodity or warranted service, cannot examine 
physically the firm in which he invests. The only con­
venient representation of the firm as a whole is its 
set of articulated financial statements. To the extent 
that the expectations of individual investors derive from 
the information contained in the published financial 
statements of firms, the investor appraisements and valu­
ations which arise therefrom depend upon the accounting
processes and processors of firms for information con-
' 33temporaneously pertinent.  ̂ If the financial information 
supplied by firms is not of this quality, it may neverthe-
3kless be treated as though it were by Investing persons.
33"...evaluation and action are everyman's business. 
To provide the corroborable and corroborated financial 
statements which will serve as the foundations of every- 
man's evaluations and actions is the business of... 
accounting." Chambers, o£. cit., p. 376.
3k
J "...the reader of a balance sheet as at a speci­
fied date will be disposed to interpret all singular 
statements in it as designating money measures as at that
2k
And if the belief that such information is presently 
pertinent is misplaced, expectations which derive from it 
will provide an undependable foundation for security valu­
ations; the investment choices of persons and the market 
prices of securities will be based on fictions.
8. Interpretation 
Now, expectations derive from one’s perceptions and 
interpretations, and information may be variously inter­
preted. similar messages, therefore, may evoke differing 
responses in different individuals, different expectations
date, notwithstanding that, to non-monetary items, there 
are appended qualifying words such as 'cost* or 'valua­
tion' (implicitly at some other date).... In general, the 
reader will not suppose that the transmitter would state a 
specific date at the outset and then in the body of the 
statement include statements relevant as at other dates.... 
He will suppose that the message is intended to be of use 
to him at or about that time, for he can imagine no reason 
why the designer and transmitter should have other 
intentions or follow rules with other effects." Ibid., 
p. 175? "...the...lay reader of a balance sheet...assumes 
that here are the present values of the assets owned by 
the concern and here is stated the present net worth.”
H. C. Daines, ”The Changing Objectives of Accounting,”
The Accounting Review, IV, No. 2 (June, 1929), 97.
35it will be c-lear that any distortion has this 
effect and clearly discriminates in favor of one or the 
other class of a firm's securityholders. So-called "con­
servatism,” for example, favors bondholders over share­
holders. See Chambers, 0£. cit., pp. 281-283? "It is of 
course always possible that people will draw wrong conclu­
sions from facts correctly stated, but this is no reason 
for withholding information from them. The justification 
offered for hiding profits is often that shareholders, if 
they knew the true profits, would make Irresponsible 
claims and thus jeopardize future earnings. This may be 
so, but the other half of the argument rests on an 
assumption of managerial infallibility and omniscience 
not often borne out by the facts." L. M. Lachmann,
Capital and Its Structure (London: G. Bell & Sons Ltd., 
1956), p. 93.
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for the future. Evidently important factors affecting 
one’s interpretation of a message are one’s knowledge and 
experience, the context in which the message is received, 
and the reliability accorded the source from which the 
message emanates.
In respect of the interpretation of messages bearing 
on investment decisions we may distinguish two classes of 
messages: (1) corroborative or objective statements, or 
those which "are capable of test by reference to evidence 
which is public, that is, which can be secured by differ­
ent observers and does not depend essentially on the 
observer, ,,36 and (2) subjective statements which subsist 
in beliefs or interpretations acknowledged "to be personal, 
not necessarily shared by others and beyond t e s t i n g ."37 
In respect of the interpretation of corroborative 
information by investors, corroborative economic, social, 
and political information is subject to diverse inter­
pretation. 38 Corroborative configurations of, and rates 
of change in, securities prices are subject to various 
interpretations as to the direction and extent of
36carl G « Eempel, "Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science," International Encyclopedia of Uni­
fied Science II, No. 7 (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1952), 22.
37chambers, 0£. cit., P. 32.
3%ar and peace news, election news, and news of a 
monetary nature, for example, are observed to evoke varying 
responses in investing persons.
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expected price movements. Corroborative ratios and
rates of change computed from the financial statements of
firms may also be accorded varying significances as
40indications of future trends. Specifically, the
current positions and past performances of firms may be
variously extrapolated and the public and private plans
4lof firms may be abandoned or disappointed.
39nence, the highly inexact nature of "technical” 
analysis. See Robert D. Edwards and John Magee, Technical 
Analysis of Stock Trends (Springfield, Mass.: John Magee, 
1964).
hr\Hence, the highly inexact nature of "fundamental" 
analysis. See Graham, Dodd, and Cottle, o£. cit., and 
witness, for example, in the financial literature the 
continuing debate concerning the relationship of the 
(corroborative) capital structures of firms to share 
prices; see in particular P. Modigliani and M. H. Miller, 
"The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance, and the Theory 
of Investment," American Economic Review, XLVIII, No. 3 
(June, 1958), 261-297; David DurancL^ "The Cost of Capital 
in an Imperfect Market: A Reply to Modigliani and Miller," 
ibid.. XLIX, No. h (September, 1959), 639-655;
Mod'igliani and Miller, "Reply," ibid., 655-669; and 
Graham, Dodd, and Cottle, o£. cit:., Chps. 40 and 48.
41That the future effects of even the corroborative 
plans of firms may be variously Interpreted largely miti­
gates the advantage of "insiders." A marketing vice- 
president, for example, may know that his firm plans 
the introduction of a "revolutionarily new" product, but 
he will require to interpret this information and his 
interpretation may be mistaken. A competitor may be at 
the very same moment laying plans for the introduction of 
an even more revolutionary product. Estimates relating to 
either the product or securities markets are inevitably 
speculations about the behavior of individuals or firms 
outside of the control and beyond the knowledge of persons 
or firms; "No set of estimates can be constructed without 
some use of...extrapolation.... In estimating the factors 
influencing his customers and suppliers--or, if his esti­
mates go deeper, the factors influencing their customers 
and suppliers— he is bound to come to variables he can 
forecast in no other way." Hart, 0£. cit., p. 77; 
"Actually, as I look back upon it, most insiders never 
knew enough really to profit from their advance news,and
27
The diverse interpretations that are possible of 
objective statements notwithstanding, the interpretation 
of subjective or speculative statements, such as the 
advice of "experts" and market tips and rumors, deserves 
particular attention. Note, however, that we reserve 
usage of the term "information" for corroborative state­
ments and events. Therefore, if B tells A, "I expect the 
earnings of Corporation X to be $100,000 in the forth­
coming quarter," the information to A is that B has 
estimated that the earnings of X will be $100,000.
A will interpret this statement in the light of his regard 
for the capability of B (his broker, say) as an estimator. 
This regard may be of a general nature or as B's capabil­
ity is established in A*s experience. In any event, the 
informative effect of such a statement upon A*s expecta­
tions will be as B*s estimation or opinion has effect. 
Considerable difficulties may therefore arise when, as
outsiders, when they occasionally uncovered something 
accurate and important, rarely sensed what to do about it 
marketwlse." G. M. Loeb, The Battle for Investment Survival 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1957)» p. j?3» "The longer I operated in Wall Street the more distrustful I became of 
tips and •inside* information of every kind. Given time,
I believe that inside information can break the Bank of 
England or the United States Treasury." Bernard M. Baruch, 
Baruch: My Own Story (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 
Inc., 1937)» p. 111. The conclusion toward which these 
observations tend is also implied in a recent dissertation 
by Esiu-Kwang Wu, "Corporate Insider Trading, Profitabil­
ity, and Stock Price Movement" (unpublished doctoral 
dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1963); specifi­
cally, Dr. Wu concludes from his analysis that corporate 
insiders, with whatever special information they may 
possess in their stock market trading, have not generally 
outperformed the stock market averages.
is usually the case, interpretations must proceed in the 
face of contrary opinions. To the same A, C (A*s barber, 
say) may express the opinion, "I expect the earnings of 
Corporation X to be $10,000 in the forthcoming quarter." 
This statement will have its informative effect also as 
C's opinion and in light of A's knowledge and experience 
generally which includes knowledge of B'r opinion and 
knowledge of A's own regard for the opinions and estima­
tions of both B and C. The interpretation of such 
messages as tips and rumors will involve even higher 
degrees of abstraction as the referents of statements, 
from which an investor may guage reliability, become 
increasingly vague.
9. Costs of Information and the 
'Marginal Concept'
The accumulation and interpretation by an investor 
of information generally relevant (that is, Information of 
a general character which does not contemplate any specific
vcourse of action) is a matter of broad general observa­
tion and experience, the resultant of higher order 
decisions involving the allocation of one's time between 
learning and leisure. But the accumulation of information 
specific to any single course of action represents sacri­
fices, generally in time and effort involving definite
^2"Relevance is a general property; its reference 
is any and all of the actions available to an actor at a 
given time." Chambers, 0£. cit., p. 1^9.
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opportunity costs to the investor and often specifically 
in payments such as fees and subscriptions. As costs 
deliberately incurred are incurred in the expectation 
of gain, it may be supposed that an investor will struc­
ture his development of information about alternative 
specific investments in such a way "that the marginal 
utility of the information content of the summarized 
information shall exceed the marginal cost of deriving 
it.
Though an investor may employ the extent of his
*44knowledge and experience generally and though he may 
compute the margins with care, (volitional, cognitive, 
and physical) constraints will limit the alternatives
^3ibld., p. 32; "Here, as in other economic affairs, 
there is a margin beyond which a gain which would be very 
attractive, 'other things equal,' is not worth pursuing, 
because to do so involves sacrificing more Important 
alternative gains. Unfortunately it must remain eternally 
a matter of guesswork just where the margin of profitable 
estimation and planning lies. For it is impossible to 
tell accurately whether assembling more data and planning 
more carefully will yield enough improvement in income 
to pay for itself.” Hart, oj). cit., p. 81.
^ 1 The investor with a technical or scientific 
background, for example, can bring his knowledge and 
aptitude into play by Including electronics, chemical, 
and other technically oriented companies among those to 
be reviewed and analyzed for his investment program. 
Similarly, any other type of specialized knowledge or 
experience may be applied by the investor, through 
concentration upon specific companies— subject, of course, 
to the risk overspecialization involves. The investor 
with a statistical bent can maintain tables, charts, and 
graphs which will be helpful and rewarding to him. Many 
other non-flnancial aims can be similarly linked with 
investment activities." Richard N. Stillman, The 
Strategy of Investment (New York: Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston, 1962), p. 21.
which he can know (to-, we may suppose, a finite, even 
small, number) and the effectiveness with which the 
consequences of any known alternative can be appraised.
And, in any case, no amount of information an investor 
can develop, analyze, and interpret can provide him 
with an expectation for the future which is certain.
As a part of the process of choice, he will require to 
conceive on only variously (un)informed bases of a 
security's future returns M-j_, M2, . ..* Mn, separated by 
successive time intervals t^, t£, ..., tn , but he cannot 
know such future monetary amounts with certainty. At 
best and after even the most probing analysis and lengthy 
deliberation, he will conceive of a series of expected 
returns. An uncertain future will require therefore 
that he conceive of the consequences of a commitment in 
some security as a series of only more or less certain 
returns: Mj_ more or less, M2 more or less, ..., Mn more 
or less.
In a mathematical sense (though the investor need 
not be explicitly aware of it), for a given security 
investment he will conceive not of a series of dividends 
(or interest or rental payments), but of a series of 
distributions, however narrow, of "probable” dividends 
over the anticipated investment period and a distribution 
of "probable" share prices (or bond prices or proceeds 
from the maturities of bonds or whatever) at the end of 
the period. He will do so because the future is uncertain,
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and he can know nothing with certainty concerning it.
CHAPTER II
THE PROBABILISTIC APPRAISEMENT 
OP SECURITY INVESTMENTS
1. Introduction 
Hitherto, we have conceived generally of probabili­
ties as only more or less intensely felt beliefs concerning 
the range of possible outcomes of some alternative action. 
As a matter of theoretical accuracy, this is the essence 
of case probability.! But as a practical matter, analysis 
typically requires concreteness beyond a mere ordinal 
ranking.2 This concreteness may be accomplished through a
l"Case probability is not open to any kind of numeri­
cal evaluation." Ludwig von Mises, Human Action (3d rev. 
ed.; Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, T9"66), p. 113; At an 
early date, von Kreis spoke of the relation between uncer­
tain events as being only that of "more or less probable," 
not capable of further specification. J. von Kreis, Die 
Prlnzipien der Wahrsoheinllchkeitsrechnung (Freiburg,
1886), pp. 26 ff., quoted in Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen,
"The Nature of Expectation and Uncertainty," Expectations, 
Uncertainty, and Business Behavior (ed. Mary Jean Bowman; 
New York: Social Science Research Council, 1958)» P. H *
2Professor Jacob Marschak suggests that his analysis 
could proceed equally well if probabilities were considered 
as ranks instead of cardinal numbers, but he does not elab­
orate the suggestion; see Jacob Marschak, "Lack of Confi­
dence," Social Research 8, No. 1 (February, 19*H), ^1-62; 
"The assumption of ordinal probabilities, however, seems 
to the present writer to lead into a blind alley. If 
probability estimates are merely ordinal, their expectation 
value, dispersion, skewness, etc., lack measurability; and 
for lack of units we are unable to set up preference scales
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metaphorical expression of subjective degrees of belief 
in numerical t e r m s .3 Persons may thus be thought to 
attach to prospective events weights which obey the cal­
culus of probability, regardless of how these weights are 
derived or of how they subsist in the minds of reasonable 
persons.^
Notice that these appraised probabilities are
among them." Albert Gailord Hart, "Risk, Uncertainty, and 
the Unprofitability of Compounding Probabilities," Studies 
in Mathematical Economics and Econometrics (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 19^2), p. 111.
3This view, it should be noted, corresponds to that 
of the Subjectivist School and has been ably developed and 
presented by Frank Plumpton Ramsey, The Foundations of 
Mathematics and Other Logical Essays (New York: Harcourt, 
Brace and Company, 1931) and Leonard J. Savage, The 
Foundations of Statistics (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 
Inc., 195*0? "According to these views, the same logical 
criteria should be applied to the, degrees of belief 
relating to, say, stock prices or the outcome of elec­
tions, etc., as to experiments with practically fair 
coins. No one denies, of course, that an element of 
objectivity enters into the degrees of belief concerning 
the conventional coin experiments to a much greater 
extent than into degrees of belief concerning the stock 
exchange, since most intelligent people arrive at (prac­
tically) the identical degrees of belief about (prac­
tically) fair coins, while the degrees of belief relating 
to the stock exchange, to business investments of all 
sorts, to political elections, ect., are subjective not 
only in principle, but are subjective in the essential 
sense of reflecting very wide interpersonal differences 
of appraisal even among the well informed."
William Fellner, Probability and Profit (Homewood,
Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, 1965), pp. 31-32.
^"...we estimate probabilities every minute of every 
day, at least implicitly, and...how we do this is unknown." 
Irving J. Good, The Estimation of Probabilities (Cambridge, 
Mass.: The M. I. T. Press, 196577 P* ly 5 "Nevertheless, for 
the purposes of making decisions, we do manage to make 
approximate estimates of probabilities. How this is done 
is an interesting problem in psychology and neuro­
psychology." Ibid., p. 4.
3^
personal and need not have Justification in the eyes of 
anyone else. It is required only that the stable and 
personal degrees of belief of an individual concerning 
the future possible outcomes of a contemplated action 
display an internal consistency, or coherence, which 
reduces to the addition of the probabilities of mutually 
exclusive events and the multiplication of the probabili­
ties of Independent events. For illustration, suppose an 
individual is convinced that at the end of pome (short) 
investment period the net price of a share,^ denoted by 
the random variable V, will assume discrete monetary
values, Vj_, vg vn , termed events on the set S.
Then he will appraise the probabilities (denoted P) with 
which he expects the share to sell at any price vA 
according to the following requirements:
(a) P(v^) = some real number 0;
(b) If (vA n vj) = 0, P(vi U vj) = P(vA) + P(vj); 
and (c) P(S) = lj
where 0 represents the null set.
Now, it will be apparent that only if the number of 
envisioned possible future prices is large may we approx­
imate the expectation of an individual concerning
5Net, that is, of expected taxes and expected trans­
action costs. The favorable taxation of capital gains is 
therefore considered, mutatls mutandl. However, as tax 
rates are observed to vary, generally with income levels, 
and from time to time as a result of legislative actions, 
and as costs of transactions are also observed to change, 
persons will require to anticipate variations in these 
rates through time.
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a particular security as a continuous probability dis­
tribution. It will be apparent also that persons are 
much more likely to conceive of a finite, even small, 
number of "representative" future prices. Nonetheless, 
a continuous distribution is consistent with the vagaries 
of the future and is analytically convenient.
Accordingly, we shall suppose an investor assesses the 
probabilities with which a given security will sell at 
various prices at some future date as a continuous dis­
tribution. As an illustration, consider the investor who 
entertains an expectation concerning a given share invest­
ment over some planning period. Now, either take the 
interval short enough or assume the periodic re-investment 
of dividends so as to restrict the expected outcome of the 
investment to the price at which the share is expected to 
sell at the end of the investment period. The vagaries of 
the future will require that the investor assess his 
expectations in probabilistic terms. He will therefore 
conceive of a distribution of "probable" future selling
"A continuous distribution...is far more convenient 
than a discrete distribution, and even if it must be lit­
erally false, it leads to conclusions regarding intervals 
of weights which would match the conclusions of an accept­
able discrete distribution so closely that there is no 
point in worrying about the difference, the difference is 
on the side of rational caution; anyway." Henry E. Kyburg, 
Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief (Middletown, 
Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1961), PP. 230-231; "The 
application of continuity to cases where it does not 
really exist illustrates the great utility which fictions 
sometimes have in science." Charles S. Peirce, quoted 
in John G. Peatman, Introduction to Applied Statistics 
(New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1963)* p. 41.
prices (or "probable" future monetary values) of the 
share. The investor may be supposed to conceive also of 
the current or appraised price (or prices) at which he 
may expect to purchase the security in question and, by 
inference, of a (continuous) probability distribution of 
possible future monetary gains and losses in cashable 
wealth as a result of the contemplated share investment. 
Figure 2-1 depicts such a probability distribution of 
gains and losses (x), defined by the probability density 
function f(x) over the range R of ex ante probable 
monetary gains and losses on the security over the 
investment horizon.? For notational consistency (and 
realism), we may suppose further that the investor con­
ceives of probabilities over small "ranges" of ex ante
. “t
gains and losses on the security and express the proba­
bility of a future outcome in any range (of gains and 
losses), say a to b, as
P(a<x<b) = f f(x)dx. aJ
2. Parametric Specification of 
Probability Distributions 
The geometrical conception of Figure 2-1 is not the 
only way in which the probabilistic expectations of persons 
may be described. In a discussion of the choices of per-
?We place no restrictions on the shape of the 
distribution except coherence with the calculus of proba­
bility; see above, p. 3 .̂
f (X)
-X 0 X
EX ANTE LO SS E S  EX ANTE GAINS
Figure 2-1. A Subjective Probability Distribution Over Ex Ante 
Gains and Losses Appraised Possible on a (Specified) Security 
Over Some (Specified) Investment Horizon.
sons among alternative securities, it is clearly not the 
best way. For this purpose it is particularly convenient 
to compute summary measures of the significant character­
istics of distributions. One Important parameter of a 
probability distribution, for example, is its mean or 
expected value or mathematical expectation, defined as
E = Jjj xf(x)dx.
We shall refer to E as the expected monetary gain (loss) 
of an investor’s probability distribution of ex ante gains 
and losses on a security. It should be clear, however, 
that this term is only imperfectly related to the verb 
"to expect.” The mathematically expected value of a dis­
tribution is no more or no less than an average; it is the 
weighted average of possible gain and loss outcomes with 
probabilities of occurrence (of those gains and losses) as
Oweights. The "expected” monetary gain (loss) on a 
security over the investment period is therefore simply a 
measure of the "center of gravity" or "central tendency" 
of the distribution of ex ante gains and losses to which 
it refers.
Having specified the mean or mathematical expectation 
of a distribution, it is convenient to compute those 
moments about the mean gain (loss) of the distribution
®Earry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection; Efficient 
Diversification of Investments, Cowles Foundation Mono­
graph No. 16 (New York; John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1959)»
p. ^8.
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which have practical significance and may therefore be 
supposed to bear upon investor choices. For example, the 
second moment^ about the mathematical expectation of a 
distribution and the square root of the second moment 
measure the dispersion of possible (gain and loss) out­
comes around the expectation (gain or loss). Alternatively 
stated, they measure the absolute uncertainty of the 
mathematically expected gain (loss) of the distribution.
The second moment, called also the variance, is defined
by
E2 = (x-E)2f(x)dx.
The square root of E2, termed the standard deviation and 
generally denoted by a, also provides a general description 
of the uncertainty surrounding the mathematical expectation 
of gain (loss).
Note here that "uncertainty" as we have used the 
term and as its statistical measures are computed implies 
nothing necessarily detrimental about a distribution. 
Uncertainty as a general characteristic implies variation: 
the existence of more than one possible outcome of some 
action. In the same way that the mathematically expected 
monetary gain (loss) on a security is an average of all
^The first moment about the mean of a distribution 
defines the mathematical expectation as a measure of loca­
tion and is by definition equal to zero. Knowledge of the 
first moment about the mean is.therefore implicit in 
Tmowledge of the mean itself.
*K>
the different possible monetary gain and loss outcomes of 
an investment (each one weighted by its associated proba­
bility), the dispersion of the distribution as a measure 
of the uncertainty surrounding the investment is a 
characteristic of the distribution of gain and loss out­
comes as a whole: of that part (if any) which represents 
possible gains, as well as of that part (if any) which 
represents possible losses.'*'®
The third moment about the mean of a probability 
distribution of monetary gains and losses thought 
probable on a security,
e3 “ Jr (x-E)-^f (x)dx,
1 oAgain, note particularly the nature of the second 
moment about the mathematical expectation of a distribu­
tion as a measure of uncertainty as generally descriptive 
of the average variation within the distribution of 
envisioned possible future outcomes. This concept of 
uncertainty is to be distinguished from the narrower 
concept of "market risk" as the possibility of loss 
alone. In the development of a measurement of risk per se 
(in the narrower sense), we may (following Evsey D. Domar 
and Richard A. Musgrave, "Proportional Income Taxation and 
Risk-Taking," Quarterly Journal of Economics, LVIII (May, 
19^), 393-39871 split the distribution of expected 
monetary gains and losses on the security into its pos­
itive and negative parts and take the average or expected 
value of each part separately. The mathematical expecta­
tion of the positive (or gain) component of the distribu­
tion, expressed as a ratio to the appraised purchase price, 
represents the expected positive yield y on the security.
The mathematical expectation of the negative (or loss) 
component, expressed as a ratio to the appraised purchase 
price, represents the expected negative yield r on the 
security. Now, in its conventional usage risk denotes the 
probability of loss, of an actual yield less than zero.
Since the individual investor is not only interested in the 
probability of a negative yield, but also in the chances of 
suffering losses of varying magnitudes, a relevant measure 
of the risk involved in a security is given by r, the summa­
tion of all possible losses weighted by their probabilities.
^  in
measures its absolute skewness and refers to the area 
under the more pronounced tail of an asymmetric distribu­
tion. As the excess tail of the distribution includes 
outcomes greater or lesser than the mean outcome, the 
distribution is described as positively or negatively 
skewed, respectively. Evidentially, positive skewness, 
the possibility of large gains, is a desirable charac­
teristic of a security's appraised probability distribu­
tion of monetary gains and losses, while negative skew­
ness, the appraised possibility of large losses on a
11security, is undesirable.
The fourth moment about the mean of a probability 
distribution,
Ety, = Jjj (x-E)^f(x)dx,
measures the absolute kurtosls, or "peakedness," of the 
distribution of ex ante gains and losses and indicates 
the degree to which the envisioned possible gains and 
losses on a security are concentrated around the modal, or 
most probable, gain (loss) outcome (a peaked curve) or 
decentralized from the modal outcome to both tails (a 
flat curve). Generally, the nth moment about the mean of 
a distribution is given by
-’-•'■This conclusion is also implied in the utility of 
wealth function specified by Harry Markowitz, "The Utility 
of Wealth," Journal of Political Economy, LX, No. 2 
(April, 1952), lf>6; see also G. L. S. Snackle,
Expectation in Economics (London: The Cambridge University 
Press, 1952), pp. 119-121.
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En = Jr (*>E)nf (x)dx,
and the fifth and higher moments measure more esoteric
characteristics. If the probability distribution is
continuous, so that an infinite number of outcomes is
possible, it is a very difficult theorem, but true, that
knowledge of all the moments is equivalent to knowledge
12of the distribution itself. An uncertain situation can
therefore be described fully by the moments of the proba-
13bility distribution of its ex ante outcomes. J We may 
suppose, however, that the number of moments of practical 
significance to the investor is finite and we denote the 
probability distribution of an investor for a security as 
an n-parameter density function over possible future gains 
and losses, and since the mathematical expectation, the 
second, third, and fourth moments clearly have important 
descriptive significance, we include these explicitly: 
f (x j E, Eg, , Ejj,, • • . , ) •
the uncertain situation has k possible outcomes, 
then it is a matter of elementary algebra that if any (k-1 ) 
moments are known, the probabilities of the k outcomes can 
be computed.
■'•̂A probability distribution may be fully described 
in other ways as well. For some purposes, for example, 
the moment generating function or the characteristic 
function (the Laplace and Fourier transforms of the proba­
bility distribution, respectively) are more useful than 
either the distribution itself or its moments. See 
Robert Dorfman, "Basic Economic and Technologic Concepts:
A General Statement," in Arthur Maass, et. al., Design 
of Water-Resouroe Systems (Cambridge, Hass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1966), p. 138.
^3
3. The Probabilistic Appraisement of 
Alternative Investments
Removing the assumption that dividends (or interest 
or rental payments) over the investment horizon are 
expected to be nil or that they are re-invested, the 
investor may anticipate such payments, also probabilis­
tically. Ignoring momentarily any discrepancies in the 
timing of monetary flows incidental to a given security, 
the mathematically expected monetary gain (loss) on the 
security in question is now obtained from the distribu­
tions of probable dividends and probable future market 
prices (all net). The mathematically expected monetary 
gain (loss) on the security is given by the sum of the 
mathematical expectations of the distributlon(s) of future 
dividends and the mathematical expectation of the distribu 
tlon of future market prices net of a current or appraised 
purchase price. The variance of this mathematically 
expected gain (loss) is given by the sum of the variances 
of the probability distributions of future dividends and 
the variance of the distribution of future market prices 
net of current price, on the assumption that these are 
Independent distributions. For simplicity, and without 
evident loss of generality, we assume hereafter the pay­
ment of all dividends, interest, or rent at the end of 
the investment planning period.
Now, though we have spoken above of the appraisal 
of a given security, it will be apparent that, as the
securities of a given class of a specific firm are 
perfectly homologous, the expectation of an investor in 
respect of any given common share (say) in Corporation X 
will be Identical. Once the investor has appraised the 
prospects of a share of X common, that is, once he has 
specified to his satisfaction the probability distribution 
of future monetary gains and losses for one such share, 
he may be supposed to contemplate alternatively-sized 
commitments in X common. For any commitment I in 
security S, therefore, an investor will envision a proba­
bility distribution of future monetary gains and losses 
on the Investment. Such a probability distribution can 
be obtained directly from the probability distribution 
of ex ante gains and losses on a single security in which 
such a commitment is considered. For an investment I 
in some number i of securities S, for example, where 
fs(x; E, E2, E^, Ety, ..., E ^  specifies the appraised 
distribution of future monetary gains and losses on a 
single security S, the probability distribution of 
ex ante gains and losses on I is given by
fs(x; IE, i2E2, i^E^, î Ejj,..... ^En)* Significantly,
the variance of the distribution of gains and losses 
on the investment increases by the square of i and the 
absolute skewness of the distribution increases by the 
oube of i as i increases. These observations will have 
specific relevance at a later time.
Again, it is the function, generally, of an 
investing person’s knowledge and experience and, in par­
ticular, of his investment analyses, to form reasoned 
expectations of the distributions of monetary outcomes 
to which we have referred; to appraise the probabilities 
with which alternative security investments may be expected 
to alter one’s wealth over an uncertain future; to Increase 
the likelihood of his optimal investment adaptation. This 
he will do to the extent he deems appropriate to choice.
He may not construct a probability distribution of the 
possible gain and loss outcomes resulting from alternative 
investments; he may not assess numerical probabilities to 
each such outcome or compute an average value or the 
variance and higher moments; but he will conceive of 
alternative outcomes for those investments he seriously 
considers; he will conceive of the di-spersion of such 
outcomes and the "chances" with which they may be 
expected to occur, if these are only more or less 
intensely felt. He will, because he is neither omnicient 
nor omnipotent, yet he must make decisions which contem­
plate the future. He will do-so because he must choose 
in the face of uncertainty.
4. A Note on the Treatment of Uncertainty 
The general scheme adopted here in the treatment of 
uncertain expectations, that each investor treats his 
expectations in terms of subjective probability distribu­
tions over possible outcomes for each alternative
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Investment commitment he entertains, corresponds to the
14"orthodox" view, well established in economic theory.
There is, however, no orthodoxy concerning the statistical 
measures to be used to describe one's expectations.
Whereas we have held that at least the first four moments 
and at most a finite number of moments are required for 
choice among distributions, writers have generally 
characterized the complete distributions by no more than 
their first and second moments (e. g., E and E2 or o),1^ a
i^See, for example, Domar and Musgrave, 0£. cit., 
pp. 381-422; William Fellner, Monetary Policies and Full 
Employment (2d ed.; Berkeley and Los Angeles: University 
of California Press, 1947)» PP. 152-158; J. H. Hicks,Value and Capital (2d ed.; London: Oxford University 
Press, i£46J, p. 125; 0. Lange, Price Flexibility and 
Full Employment (Bloomington, Indiana: The Principle 
Press, 1944), p. 30; Friederich and Vera Lutz, The Theory 
of Investment of the Firm (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, l95i)> Chp. XV; Helen Makower and Jacob Marschak, 
"Assets, Prices, and Monetary Theory," Economica, V,
No. 19 (August, 1938), 261-288; Gunnar Myrdal, Monetary 
Equilibrium (London: W. Hodge & Co., Ltd., 1939)» PP. 58- 
59; A. d. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare (4th ed.;
London: Macmillan and Co., 193277 Appendix 1.
•^professor Jacob Marschak adds to the mean and 
standard deviation a supplementary measure of the "relia­
bility" of alternative distributions. He says: "It must 
be recognized that an individual may estimate two assets 
as having the same expected value, yet be aware that the 
two estimates have different degrees of reliability 
according to the different types of information at his 
disposal. This...calls for the use of additional concepts 
(reliability) analogous to those developed by the modern 
theory of statistical inference." Jacob Marschak, "Lack 
of Confidence," Social Research, VIII, No. 1 (February, 
1941), 53. This position represents a general dissatis­
faction with the use of numerical assessments of case 
(subjective) probabilities and suggests that these proba­
bilities must be "discounted" in some generally unspeci­
fied way. (See, for example, J. von Neumann and 0. 
Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (3d ed.; 
Princeton: PrincetonUniversityPress, 1^53)» P. i9 ff.;
R. D. Luce and H. Ralffa, Games and Decisions (New York:
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16position we reject as clearly unsatisfactory.
Shackle*s Objection Considered
At a general level, it should be noted that the 
orthodox treatment of uncertainty has never seemed com­
pletely adequate to many students of the problem and has,
17upon occasion, been severely attacked. G. L. S. Shackle 
has been particularly critical of the use of probability 
notions as applied to the behavior of uncertain investors
John Wiley & Sons, Ino., 1957)» Appendix 1; and especially 
J. M. Keynes, A Treatise on Probability (London: The 
Macmillan Company, 1921), p. 3^3 ^f. ) But "how far should 
such an argument be pushed? Should an additional discount 
be added, for example, to_ cover the unreliability of the 
reliability estimate*s reliability?" Donald E. Farrar,
The Investment Decision Under Uncertainty (Englewood Cliffs, 
N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., £962}, p. 6. Professor A. G. 
Hart, in an article fetchingly entitled "Risk, Uncertainty, 
and the Unprofitability of Compounding Probabilities," 
op. cit., argues effectively against such a procedure.
And in deference to Occam* s Razor we forgo any attempt 
to further complicate the present analysis.
^See above, pp. 39-42; "We are not affected merely 
by what we regard as the most probable of a set of possible 
outcomes, or even by an average ’expected value* weighted 
by various probabilities; we are affected in our behavior 
by the less probable or even by the most improbable, of 
possible outcomes, as witnessed by the demand for sweep­
stakes tickets, wildcat shares, and, in some cases, matri­
mony." Kenneth E. Boulding, A Reconstruction of Economics 
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1950), p. TT7; "It is 
a simplification to assume that the Investor chooses 
among the alternative probability distributions...avail­
able to him on the basis of only two parameters of those 
distributions. Even if the simplification is accepted, 
the mean and standard deviation may not be the pair of 
parameters that concern the investor." J. Tobin,
"Liquidity Preference as Behavior Towards Risk," The 





and apparently has been unable to conceive of probability 
as having other than a class meaning. Shackle’s objec­
tions to orthodoxy at a general level have themselves
18been critically considered by Chase. In the construc­
tion of an alternative theory, Shackle contends that to 
each possible (investment) course of action the Investor 
attaches a "focus-gain" and a "focus-loss." The investor 
then selects that course of action whose combination of 
focus-gain and focus-loss he prefers to all other avail­
able combinations of the two. But, in this regard 
Shackle's theory lacks convincing appeal. By ending with 
two values relevant for choice (the focus-gain and the 
focus-loss), Shackle has simply eliminated a large number 
of other possibilities. And saying that "investors con­
centrate on two from among all the possible outcomes
seems no more inherently correct than saying that they
concentrate on three or ten— or even on one, the ultimate 
19reduction." 7 Or: It seems perfectly permissible to be 
uneasy, along with Shackle (and Chase), about the use of
•^Samuel B. Chase, Jr., Asset Prices in Economic 
Analysis (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1963), p.
^■^Ibld., pp. 62 and 7^. This argument applies with 
(at least) equal force to Professor Angell's "'most 
likely' gain outcome" and "'most likely' loss outcome." 
Cf. especially: "He does not, in his own mind, in effect 
balance or trade a small increase in prospective gain, 
for example, against a small decrease in likelihood.
Once his estimates of the 'most likely' gain and loss 
outcomes are made, all other possible outcomes cease to 
interest him." James W. Angell, "Uncertainty, Likeli­
hoods and Investment Decisions," Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, LXXIV, No. 1 (February, I96C), 6.
9̂
"probability distribution reasoning," and still to prefer 
it to Shackle's theory, for many features of investor 
behavior cannot be rationalized in any other manner yet 
developed, including S h a c k l e ' s . ^
Knight1s Objection Considered
Also in opposition to orthodoxy, Prank H. Knight2! 
has preferred to differentiate situations of (objective) 
"risk" from those of (subjective) uncertainty. In 
Knightian reasoning, to qualify as a risk situation an 
experiment must be repetitive in nature and must possess 
an objective frequency distribution from which observa­
tions can be made and from which Inferences can be drawn 
by statistical procedures. Problems involving conjecture 
and to which the concept of class (frequency) probability 
is not applicable are held to involve uncertainty, not 
risk. Knight then concludes that entrepreneurial decisions 
and profits (and presumably individual investment decisions) 
belong in the theory of uncertainty, not in that of.risk.
20"The notion that human beings simply cannot set up 
meaningful 'subjective probabilities' and apply them to the 
likelihood that events "may diverge from a central estimate 
strikes me as unacceptable. ...it would leave us with 
such very untractable models that analysis would be para­
lyzed.... Whatever happened, we would be reduced to saying 
we supposed the outcome was what people in some sense pre­
ferred. ...the notion that people cannot visualize proba­
bilities of contingencies does not strike me as plausible. 
An everyday piece of evidence is the place in our folk­
ways of the 'fair bet.'" Albert Hart, quoted in 
Mary Jean Bowman, "Introduction," Expectations, Uncer­
tainty , and Business Behavior, op. cit., p. 67
2:!-Prank H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 19^0).
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The difficulty with Knightian reasoning is that it does 
not develop a theory of uncertainty. It simply suggests 
that if there does exist a useful theory of uncertainty, 
it must be different from the theory of probability in the 
frequency-objectivist sense, though there may exist border­
line problems which it is difficult to classify.
The discussion which Knight presents is apt to 
leave the reader with the impression that the process of 
decision under uncertainty is left completely open to the 
creativity of the Individual decision-maker and that "any­
thing goes." Yet, by subjecting degrees of belief in 
general to the uniform rules of numerical probability 
merely Implies that the entire set of degrees of belief 
which a person holds must obey the internal consistency 
requirements of probability theory. The development of 
coherent degrees of belief is left entirely to the crea­
tive faculties of the individual decision-maker. But it 
does seem that any useful decision theory must be able to 
draw a distinction between consistent behavior, on the one 
hand, and erroneous or whimsical behavior, on the other.
It is therefore unsatisfactory to argue that in matters of 
decision-making under uncertainty incoherence is permis­
sible. And while Knight may not have intended to suggest 
a wholly anarchic attitude toward the area of uncertainty, 
he leaves many of his readers with the impression that the 
main difference between risk and uncertainty is that an 
articulate theory is applicable to the former but not to
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the latter.22 Again, it seems perfectly permissible to 
be uneasy, now along with Knight, about the use of proba­
bility distribution reasoning and still to prefer it (now) 
to no theory of uncertainty at all.
22pellner, Probability and Profit, pp. 29-31.
CHAPTER III
THE UTILITY OP UNCERTAIN PROSPECTS
1. Introduction 
An investor, we have said, will require to appraise 
the probabilities associated with the various envisioned 
outcomes or consequences of commitments in alternative 
securities over some Investment horizon. Solely as an 
analytical convenience we have assumed an investor will 
assign numerical probabilities to each alternative possi­
ble outcome in a fashion consistent with the requirements 
of mathematical probability theory and that he will 
arrive finally at a probability distribution over the 
expected gains and losses for each of a finite set of 
alternative investments. Since expectations derive from 
the interpretation of information available to the 
investor at the time a decision is required, given the 
extent of his knowledge and experience generally, judg­
ments concerning future gains and losses on securities 
and the (case) probabilities assigned to alternative out­
comes reflect the intensely personal and perhaps contro­
versial beliefs and opinions of the investor at hand.
But the specification of distributions such as 
those of which we have spoken for a set of securities,
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while a necessary part of reasoned choice, does not 
itself constitute choice. His analysis completed, or 
cut short, an investor will require to select from among 
appraised alternatives, the outcomes of all of which are 
uncertain, those, if any, to which he will commit his 
wealth. Though he cannot know beforehand the conse­
quences of his investment choices, he will require to 
select his portfolio.
Now, when early mathematicians first formulated 
principles of human behavior under conditions of chance 
and uncertainty (primarily gambling situations), they 
assumed that the objective of choice was to maximize 
expected monetary gain. For illustration, consider an 
investor who contemplates the allocation of his wealth 
among alternative securities i, for each of which he has 
in mind the mathematical expectation of gain G-̂ . For 
the present, assume a uniform Investment period. As 
specific securities are perfectly homologous (the 
mathematically expected gain on identical securities is 
identical), it follows that an investor would never 
prefer a diversified portfolio. If one security promised 
a greater expected monetary gain them any other, the 
investor would place all of his funds in that security.
If several securities promised the same (greatest) 
expected gain in wealth to the investor, he would be 
Indifferent among portfolios, diversified or not, which 
contained only those securities, in whatever
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quantities. But investing persons are observed to 
diversify their holdings. This contradiction is 
sufficient to enjoin our tentative rejection of the 
view that persons choose among alternative courses of 
investment actions to maximize expected monetary gains 
to themselves.
2. A Digression on Certainty Equivalence
More recently, decision theorists have sought to 
explain the investment choices of persons in terms of 
certainty equivalence models. They begin by assuming 
uncertainty (dispersion) to be ,lbad.M Consequently, a 
reasonable investor can be Induced to increase the 
uncertainty which he will bear only if it is accompanied 
by a compensatory increase in the expected gain of an 
alternative. Prior to choice, the expected gains of 
alternatives require to be discounted by some measure of 
the uncertainty involved in each. Not infrequently, 
therefore, the certainty equivalence approach to decision­
making is referred to as an "uncertainty discount" approach.2
The procedure of certainty equivalence is quite 
straightforward. Having chosen some measure of the 
central tendency of an investment alternative (generally
•^Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection: Efficient . 
Diversification of Investments, Cowles foundation Mono­
graph No. '16 (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1959)* 
p. 207.
2Donald E. Farrar, The Investment Decision Under 
Uncertainty (Englewood Cliff s, N1. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,1962), p. 11.
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the expected monetary gain or rate of return), a measure 
of its dispersion (generally the standard deviation) is 
also selected. The theorist then constructs an artifi­
cial variate,
v = f (p, ,ct) , (1)
where v is the alternative's certainty equivalent, n is 
its expected value (of gain, i.e., E, or return, for 
example), and a is the standard deviation of the proba­
bility distribution of outcomes of the alternative.
The certainty equivalent's function is to collapse 
the two parameters, expected value and dispersion, of an 
uncertain prospect into a single dimension "from which 
uncertainty has been purged and by which, therefore, 
unambiguous choices can be made."^ The function,
v0 = f (m- ,o), (2)
then, can be likened to an indifference curve defined by 
the locus of (m-,o) points whose values are evaluated equal 
to the certain receipt of v q  dollars. For each alterna­
tive investment described by the points (m.,o), a unique 
certainty equivalent exists,
vj = f(nj,oj), (3)
by which its desirability can be compared to that of 
other opportunities.
^Ibid., p. 12.
The solution, choosing the investment whose 
expected value and uncertainty are equivalent to the 
investor of the certain receipt of vq dollars, is in 
most respects identical to the classical equilibrium of 
consumer choice. It envisions the maximization of an 
objective function (the certainty equivalent) subject to 
the constraints of the investor*s wealth and the avail­
able investment opportunities. Geometrically, it con­
sists of the usual tangency between an indifference curve 
and the border of a set of obtainable combinations; where 
in equilibrium, the investor’s marginal rate of substitu­
tion between expected value (of gain, for example) and 
dispersion is equal to his marginal rate of transforma­
tion between these parameters.^
Notice that the certainty equivalence approach,
though it may speak of risk, discounts uncertainty.^ But
as we have noted above, the uncertainty of an investment
alternative as measured by the dispersion of expected
gains and losses on the investment is not detrimental
per se. On the contrary, positive skewness in the dis-
£trlbution is desirable. Yet, a certainty equivalence 
model of the form given in (3) would '’discount" the 
expected gain on a security, say 100 dollars, for the
^Ibid., p. U .
^That is, variation in the possible outcomes of an alternative action.
(L°See above, pp. 4-0-41.
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(albeit slight) probability envisioned by the investor of 
a gain of 1,000 dollars (say) on the security. This 
contradicts reason and common observation and is clearly 
untenable.
Secondly and conclusively, as it is usually 
developed, the certainty equivalence approach examines 
each alternative as an individual investment, and not as 
a portion of a larger set of investment holdings. Con­
sequently, it can never explain the reasonable possession 
of more than one security (the best) by an investor at 
any moment in time.? The certainty equivalence models 
inability to explain the observed existence of diversified 
portfolios is undoubtedly one of its most serious weak-
Qnesses. It reduces it to virtual impotence.
3. Further Digression: The Procedure 
of Markowitz Considered
It should be observed that certainty equivalence, 
at least as an explanation of investor behavior, has been 
rescued from certain oblivion by Harry Markowitz. In a 
widely acclaimed contribution, Markowitz demonstrates 
that the same mentality which motivates the certainty 
equivalence approach to uncertainty (that is, a preference 
for expected value and a distaste for dispersion) can be 
shown to lead to the development of a balanced, or
7see above, pp. 53-5^.
®Farrar, 0£. cit., p. 16.
diversified, portfolio of investment securities.^ The
substance of Markowitz* (largely geometric) argument has
10been succinctly described by Farrar. Let represent 
a price index for security i, having unit value during 
the current time period. Assume the existence of n such 
securities.
M-i * E(Xj.)
denotes the expected price (index) of security i at the 
end of the investment horizon or planning period. For 
each pair of alternatives, i and J, the investor antici­
pates a covariance,
aij = E(X1-p,i) (Xj —|j, j ),
about their expected values. Like investor anticipations 
generally, this estimate for each pair of alternatives 
derives from the knowledge and experience of the individ­
ual in question; in particular, his knowledge of, and
11experience with, correlations in security returns.
^Harry Markowitz, "Portfolio Selection," Journal of 
Finance, VII, No. 1 (March, 1952), 77-91.
10Farrar, o£. cit., pp. 16-18.
11 "The correlation among returns is not the same 
for all securities. We generally expect the returns on a 
security to be more correlated with those in the same 
Industry than those of unrelated industries. Business 
connections among corporations, the fact that they service 
the same area, a common dependence on military expendi­
tures, building activity, or the weather can increase the 
tendency of particular returns to move up or down together. 
Markowitz, Portfolio Selection: Efficient Diversification 
of Investments, p. 5.
is the proportion of the investor’s total portfolio 
committed to security 1: = 1, therefore; and
is the portfolio Itself.
The application of expected value operators to the 
weighted sum shows that a portfolio's expected value is 
nothing but the same weighted sum of each security's 
Individual expected value,
E(1 ) “ Dcim-1 , i — 1,2, ...,n;
and that its variance can be expressed as the quadratic 
form,
V(r) = î* i j •  ̂ 3 = 1, 2, ..., n.
Next, decomposing the portfolio's variance into a linear 
sum of the variances and covariances, respectively, of 
individual securities,
we note the possibility of a portfolio whose variance is 
smaller than the smallest variance possessed by a single 
security depends only on the existence of sufficiently 
small covariance elements. There is, of course, no 
apparent reason why the covariance elements cannot be 
negative and why, therefore, a diversified portfolio
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cannot yield a variance which is smaller, for almost any
given expected value (of gain or return), than that for
a single security. In fact, it can easily be shown that
1 ?"such is usually the case."
The untenable assumption of uncertainty avoidance 
notwithstanding,"^ however, the procedure suggested by 
Markowitz is unsatisfactory as an explanation of investor 
behavior on several important grounds. First, by pos­
turing his analysis in terms which involve a re-orienta­
tion of the manner in which an investor is assumed to 
evaluate alternative Investment commitments'— terms which 
suggest that an investor focuses upon the performance 
(return and stability) of an overall portfolio— Markowitz 
endears himself to trust managers but departs from the 
a priori well-grounded. That portfolio performance is 
but an incidental, though important, consequence of 
individually considered, appraised, and evaluated invest­
ment commitments, though certainly expected correlations 
among the performances of securities may be given consid­
eration (primarily in the selection of alternatives to 
appraise and evaluate), seems highly appealing to reason.
In the absence of sufficient supporting evidence, a 
contrary position must remain a Markowitz hypothesis.
l2Farrar, oja. cit., p. 18; see also Markowitz, 
"Portfolio SeleclTion" and Portfolio Selection; Efficient 
Diversification of Investments, Part III.
13lndeed, we could easily recast the certainty equiv­
alence model to discount risk per se (r) in the sense dis­
cussed above; see above, p. kO,
Second and more damaging, in demonstrating the 
logical consistency of certainty equivalence and observed 
diversification, Markowitz practically precludes non­
diversifying behavior. Correlations among individual
firms and securities are matters of reason and common 
1 Aobservation. Therefore, if uncertainty is to be reduced 
and overall stability is to be increased, investors will 
d i v e r s i f y . A t  the theoretical level, Tobin has shown 
that, provided it is derived "from a two-parameter family 
[ij,,a] of probability distributions,” a rlsk-averter*s 
Indifference curve is necessarily concave upward: ”A11
16risk-averters are diversifiers; plungers do not exist." 
Yet, non-diversifying behavior is observable in practice 
and capable of Justification in theory.^
^ " A . .. salient feature of security investment is the 
correlation among security returns." Markowitz, Portfolio 
Selection: Efficient Diversification of Investments, p. 5.
15«The fact that security returns are highly corre­
lated, but not perfectly correlated, implies that diversi­
fication can reduce risk but not eliminate it." Markowitz, 
Portfolio Selection: Efficient Diversification of Invest­
ments, p7 T,
Tobin, "Liquidity Preference as Behavior 
Towards Hisk," The Review of Economic Studies, XXV,
No. 67 (February, 1958), ?£7
17"There is a well-known argument against diversi­
fication based on Andrew Carnegie's maxim: 'Put all your 
eggs in one basket and watch the basket.*" Benjamin Graham, 
David L. Dodd, sued Sidney Cottle, Security Analysis (^th ed. 
New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1962), p7"~557~"Dlversi- 
fication is a necessity for the beginner. But those who 
have experience and are capable of running risks have a 
better chance of getting rich by not diversifying."
G. M. Loeb, The Battle for Investment Survival (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1957), p. 11.
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4. The 'St. Petersburg Paradox' Considered 
An increasingly accepted approach to the explana­
tion of decision-making under uncertainty postulates
18(expected) utility, not the expected value of monetary
gain (return) or certainty equivalence, maximization as
the criterion of individual choice under uncertainty.
The classic demonstration is due to the Bernoulli family
19and is widely known; A "rational" man is offered the 
chance to flip a coin until the event "heads" appears. 
Should it appear on the first throw, he receives $1.
Should it appear on the second, third, fourth, ..., nth 
throw, he receives $2, $4, $8, ..., (,|2) , respectively.
What is the amount of money the outright receipt of 
which a reasonable man would consider equivalent to the 
privilege of playing this game on the receiving side?
■*-®The use of the term "utility" throughout will 
refer to the utility of "acts" and not to the utility of 
"consequences" as the term has been traditionally used in 
economics. The use of the term in the former sense is due 
to John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, Theory of Games 
and Economic Behavior (3d ed.; Princeton, N. J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1953). In the older, more traditional 
sense, utility was a probability-less conception. Thus, 
economists referred not only to the utility of money, but 
also to the utility of (certain) consequences such as 
commodities (and services) and combinations of commodities 
(i.e., patterns of consumption). This probability-less 
conception of utility has now been discredited in the eyes 
of most economists. See Leonard J. Savage, The Founda­
tions of Statistics (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 
i95*0, PP. 93-96.
Bernoulli, "Exposition of a New Theory on the 
Measurement of Risk," Papers of the Imperial Academy of 
Science, V (Petersburg, 1738), trans. L. Sommer, Eoono- 
me’farloa, 22, No. 1 (January, 195*0, 23-36.
The expected monetary value of such a game, 
assuming the coin to be fair, is computed as follows:
CO CO
v = t|1d ) t(2)t"1 = £ = *•
One might therefore expect a reasonable, expected mone­
tary gain maximizer to prefer the privilege of playing 
this game to the (certain) receipt of any finite amount 
of money! It is intuitively obvious, however, that no
reasonable man would do so; hence, the "St. Petersburg
20Paradox" of Nicholas Bernoulli.
In the first published resolution of the paradox 
formulated by his older cousin, Daniel Bernoulli stated 
the problem in an alternative way: How much, he asks,
might one expect a reasonable man to pay for the privi­
lege of playing such a game? The answer for an expected 
monetary gain maximizer is, again, virtually any finite 
amount. Why, then, asks Bernoulli, are players so scarce 
at twenty (or even ten) dollars a game?
Numerous answers are possible. Some emphasize the
91very small probability of long series. The probability
20por an extended discussion, see William Fellner, 
Probability and Profit (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. 
Irwin, Inc., 1965), pp. 101-108; for a specific formula­
tion of the paradox as it relates to the appraisal of 
securities with growth prospects, see David Durand,
"Growth Stocks and the Petersburg Paradox," Journal of 
Finance, XII, No. 3 (September, 1957), 348-35J7
21D*Alembert contends that "very long runs are not 
only very improbable, but do not occur at all." Quoted in 
J. M. Keynes, A Treatise on Probability (London: The 
Macmillan Company, 1921), p. 3l7. Or as Keynes remarked:
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of twenty successive tails, for instance,
p20 = <*)20.
equals 0.9537{10~), if the coin Is fair. Others 
emphasize the inevitably finite resources of the offerer. 
Even a fairly short series of tails would break a moderate
ppbank. Sould the bank’s resources be limited to one 
million dollars, for example, the twentieth consecutive 
tail would break it. The potential monetary payoffs for 
tails thrown beyond that limit are meaningless. The 
game’s meaningful expected value under such a constraint 
becomes
V = 4(19) = $9.50,
considerably less than an infinite amount.
But, the above discussed considerations notwith­
standing, the St. Petersburg paradox lies, most critics 
are generally agreed, in the symmetrical treatment of 
possible outcomes by the expected monetary gain maximiza­
tion criterion, in its assumption of proportionality 
between money and utility. Bernoulli, for example, 
contends that $20 (say) is not, but is less than, twenty 
times as valuable to an individual as $1. So, certainly, 
is $20 million less than twenty times as valuable as
"In the long run we are all dead." And this would seem 
especially so in the infinitely long run.
22Ibld.
$1 million. At the other extreme, is a loss of $10,000
exactly twice as unpleasant as a loss of Or,
stated otherwise, what is the value to an investor of
the dollar that stands between himself and financial
ruin? Clearly, the utility to an investor of each dollar
23of his wealth is not the. same.  ̂ A symmetrical treatment 
of the value of one's first and last unit of wealth fails 
to explain the behavior of a person who insures or 
diversifies or refuses to stake his fortune on the 
St. Petersburg game. Our rejection of expected monetary 
gain maximization as a choice criterion is firmly 
established in reason and observation.
In the development of a surrogate theory of choice 
under uncertainty, Bernoulli suggests that the monetary 
value of a person’s wealth is not its true, or "moral," 
worth to him. Accordingly, he postulates that persons 
seek to maximize the expected value of "moral" worth, 
or "moral expectation." And he argues further that a 
fixed increment of money wealth typically results in an 
even smaller increment of moral wealth as the basic 
monetary wealth to which the increment applies is 
increased.
Operationally, as it concerns behavior in the face
23"lt seems apparent that, unlike Gertrude Stein's 
'A Rose is a Rose is a Rose,* a dollar is not a dollar 
without regard for the number of its fellows." Farrar, 
op. olt., p. 11; "Only the miser is like the mathemati­
cian : both of them esteem money in proportion to its 
numeric quantity." Buffon, "Essai d'Arithmetic Morale," 
quoted in Keynes, loo, olt.
of uncertainty, moral expectation is expectation of 
utility, stripped of any hedonistic (pleasure-pain) 
interpretation. Daniel Bernoulli’s resolution of his 
cousin's famous paradox rests, therefore, upon the prin­
ciple of diminishing marginal utility of wealths that the 
marginal utility to an investor of money gains diminishes
oh,as his expected monetary gains rise. ^ In mathematical 
terms, the individual's utility function for wealth is 
concave from below. While the declining probability of 
increasingly late first appearances of heads in the St. 
Petersburg game i_s fully offset by increasingly large 
monetary payoffs, it is not fully offset by steeply 
rising aggregate utility payoffs. And what is relevant 
to an actor's choice is the utility of monetary payoffs. 
The noneonvergent progression which represents the 
expected monetary value of the game is replaced by a 
progression expressing the utility equivalents of poten­
tial monetary payoffs. Because one's marginal utility 
for monetary gains is taken to decrease (monotonically), 
the St. Petersburg game yields a convergent p r o g r e s s i o n . 2 ^ 
We are led to a criterion which postulates that an actor 
chooses to allocate his wealth among alternatives so as 
to maximize his "expected utility," the mathematical 
expectation of utility gains to himself.
2^Savage, ojd. olt. . pp. 93-9^.
25pellner, 0£. olt., p. 102.
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5. Operational Utility
Daniel Bernoulli did not attempt to specify further 
the nature of the utility functions for money of individ­
uals by examining what amounts of money with certainty 
they would actually consider the equivalents of various 
prospects under uncertainty. Nor was the St. Petersburg 
game suitable for experimental reproduction, since, as we 
have noted, it is essential to the operation of the game 
that the offerer be able (or, at least, thought to be 
able) to pay out money without limit. The operational 
formulation remained to Ramsey, ^  Friedman-Savage,2^
pOand particularly to von Neumann-Morgenstern. Their 
research, which begins by formulating axioms of which the 
maximization of the mathematical expectation of utility 
is a corollary, has shown that it is possible to derive 
generalizations about a person’s utility for money that 
are consistent with logic and the observations of repeated 
decisions. In a most important contribution, they demon­
strate that it is possible to associate the unambiguous 
concept of expected monetary values with some arbitrary
2^Frank Plumpton Ramsey, The Foundations of Mathe­
matics and Other Logical Essays (New York: HarcourFJ
Brace and Company, i9jii ) •
2?Milton Friedman and L. J. Savage, "The Utility 
Analysis of Choices Involving Risk," Readings in Price 
Theory (eds. George J. Stigler and Kenneth E. Bouldlng; 
Chicago: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1952), pp. 57-96.
ppJohn von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern,op. clt.
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index of a decision-maker’s utility. It is therefore 
possible for us to contemplate not only how a complex 
set of alternative investments might be reduced to a set 
of expected monetary gains and losses, as we have done, 
but to demonstrate how such a set of expected outcomes 
might be transformed into utility measures for purposes 
of decision-making. We require, therefore, to develop 
the concept of an individual’s utility function for 
cashable wealth.
Consider, then, an individual who confronts an 
alternative A^ which promises two different consequences, 
zero dollars and some positive number of dollars xlt with 
equal case probabilities. Assign an arbitrary index to 
each monetary amount, the only restriction being that the 
index for the x^ number of dollars be greater than the 
index for zero dollars. We may conceive of a number of 
such choices and arrive at a utility index of the form,
U(x^) = some number,
representing the individual's utility index for any amount 
of money. Though it is not necessary, for convenience, 
choose U(0) = 0 (to be read: ”The utility of zero dollars 
is zero”), as the arbitrary zero point on the utility 
scale. Now select arbitrarily U(x^) = 1 (to be read:
•'The utility of x^) dollars is 1”). The expected utility 
of alternative A^ is the sum of the utility assignments 
to the possible consequences, weighted by the appropriate
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probabilities:
e[u (a 1)] = Kn(o)] + KuUi)],
= £(o) + i d )
= i
Now, formulate an alternative to A^, which yields 
some amount of money with certainty, A2. Accordingly as 
the individual prefers A2 to Alf U(A2) > U(A^) = i, the 
utility of A2 on our scale is greater than §. Continue 
to formulate alternatives until for some alternative A^, 
which promises some certain amount x2, the individual 
considers An as attractive as A^ (that is, he is 
indifferent between these alternatives). Thus, the 
utility assignment to x'2 dollars should be:
U(x2) = iCU(O)] + §[u(xi)]
= i
Additional utility evaluations for sums of money 
between zero and x^ dollars could be made in a similar 
manner, each time finding the sum which must be offered 
with certainty to make the individual indifferent to the 
uncertain prospect. A consistent measure for sums in 
excess of x^ dollars may be derived from a comparable 
process, as may the (dis)utility index to be assigned 
to losses of dollar amounts. Any number of utility-money 
pairs may be induced in this general fashion. These are 
said to comprise the individual's utility function for
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money wealth, U(x).
It will be clear that the scale of such a function 
and Its origin are arbitrarily determined.2^ For a given 
individual, utility functions formulated on the basis of 
different scales and zero points would result in identical 
decisions among given alternatives. For a given utility 
function, we could add a oonstant to each utility index, 
or multiply each by a constant, and maintain the ordering 
capability of the original function. If c and k are 
constants, we may compute
Ua (x ) = c + kU(x ).
Ua (x) can serve as well as U(x) as a representation of 
the utility function of the Individual at hand. But it 
is clearly improper to compare the utility schedules of 
individuals. The utility function of any person depends 
upon preferences alone and is uniquely individual. It 
is not open to further analysis or refutation.
6. General Specification of the Individual's 
Utility of Wealth Function
Considerations of scale and comparability aside, 
we may draw certain reasoned generalizations concerning 
an individual's utility function for cashable (money)
29The utility function, in other words, is measur­
able up to a linear transformation. See A. A. Alchian, 
"The Meaning of Utility Measurement," American Economic 
Review, XLIII, No. 1 (March, 1953), pp. 26-50
w e a l t h . p o r  example, Inasmuch as wealth is generally 
desirable, an individual will prefer more wealth to less. 
The utility measure of a given stock of wealth may be 
supposed to be greater than that of any lesser stock.
That is: the utility function will rise over any relevant 
range of wealth. Since the slope of the function is 
defined as the ratio of an incremental change in the 
utility index as a result of an incremental change in 
wealth, other things constant, we may restate the pre­
ceding condition to read: the individual's utility 
function for wealth has positive slope over any relevant 
range:
This measure corresponds to an individual's marginal 
utility of wealth.
It is reasonable to regard the marginal utility 
of wealth as relatively unaffected by "small” changes in 
one's wealth. Alternatively stated, for "small" changes
^Conjectures at,out the individual's utility func­
tion supported by empirical observations were first made 
by Milton Friedman and L. J. Savage, "The Utility Analysis 
of Choices Involving Risk," Journal of Political Economy, 
LVI, No. ^ (August, 19^8), 279-3^; reprinted with a 
correction in Readings in Price Theory, loo, olt. Our 
development follows that of Harry Markowitz, "The Utility 
of Wealth," Journal of Political Economy, LX, No. 2 
(April, 1952}, "which explains what the F-S
hypothesis explains, avoids the contradiction with common 
observation to which the F-S hypothesis is subject, and 
explains still other phenomena concerning behavior under 
uncertainty." Ibid., p. 152.
in the wealth of an individual, his utility function 
over that range has approximately constant slope and may 
he taken as linear. Now, if an individual’s utility 
function is strictly linear, he will maximize expected 
utility by maximizing the mathematical expectation of 
monetary gains in wealth. For such persons, expected 
monetary gain will guide decision-making. But, for large 
variations in the wealth of an Individual, this condition 
is unlikely. It is observable that in the choice among 
alternatives, the one that gives rise to the highest 
expected value is not invariably preferred. The mathe­
matically expected value is, after all, only partially 
descriptive of the appraised alternative to which it 
refers. A familiar example of situations in which it is 
observable that persons frequently choose the alternative 
which does not have the highest expected value is provided 
by insurance, since insurance premiums are invariably
ogreater than the expected value of the loss in wealth
insured against. The tendency of persons to insure
31against losses (and to diversify portfolios) is 
explained by a utility of wealth function which is con­
cave from below for some range of wealth below present 
wealth.
3*Markowitz has shown that "...if an individual's 
utility curve is strictly concave, diversification between 
two equally good portfolios cannot produce a worse port­
folio and generally will produce a better one." Markowitz, 
Portfolio Selection; Efficient Diversification of Invest­ment, p. 216"
The desire to avoid danger (to insure against 
significant losses) seems, however, to be at work in 
persons simultaneously with a desire to court danger.
Many of the same persons who insure against losses also 
buy lottery tickets. Or, to state the relevant analogy, 
some of the same investors who diversify are observed to 
include in their portfolios highly speculative electronics 
and mining shares. Persons therefore reveal a willingness 
to accept risky alternatives which promise a small chance 
of "relatively large" gains in return for modest invest­
ments, even though the mathematical expectation of gain 
may make the "gamble" an "unfair" one. The observed 
willingness of persons to accept unfair bets is explained 
by a utility of wealth function which is convex from 
below for some range of wealth above present wealth; that 
is, over some range of expected gains in wealth.
Furthermore, though the slope of the utility 
function for wealth of an Individual may be supposed to 
increase sharply as the amount of losses increases, 
implying the proportionately larger disutility of large 
losses in wealth, the slope of the function may be 
supposed to decrease after some point of "financial ruin," 
beyond which further losses no longer "really matter" to 
the individual. This is to say that the Individual’s 
utility of wealth function is bounded from below for 
"very large" losses in wealth.
In sum, these observations enjoin a general view of
the individual's utility of wealth function as neither 
everywhere concave or everywhere convex, but concave for 
some range of wealth below present wealth, then convex 
for a range of wealth above present wealth to an 
"aspiration level" of w e a l t h , t h e n  concave again, and 
generally bounded in the extremes, as that in Figure 3-1. 
Such a curve is consistent with Insurance against losses 
(and diversification), gambling, and because it is bounded 
from above, avoids the St. Petersburg Paradox. The 
hypothesized curve is consistent with the existence of 
actuarily "unfair" Insurance and actuarily "unfair" 
lotteries. Because people are observed to avoid sym­
metric bets, the curve is assumed to fall faster to the 
left of the origin (given by the level of present wealth) 
than it rises to the right of the origin. The individ- 
"will take large chances of a small loss for a small 
chance for a large gain."3^ Moreover, the hypothesis 
Implies essentially the same behavior for a person 
whether he is rich or poor, except the location of the 
utility function's inflection points, and therefore the 
meanings of "small" and "large" or "very large," will
32por a contextual discussion of the concept of 
"aspiration level," see Sidney Siegel, "Level of Aspira­
tion and Decision Making," Psychological Review, LXIV,
No. if (July, 1957), 253-262.
■^I.e., U(x1) > | U (—x)| , for x^ > 0.
^Markowitz, "The Utility of Wealth," p. 155.
0  = p re se n t  w ea l th
Figure 3-1. A Utility of Wealth Function Consistent with Risk- 
aversion (insurance and Diversification) and Risk-taking 




3%ote that this specification of the individual 
investor’s utility of wealth function is general. We 
acknowledge the observed existence of "risk-lover" and 
"risk-averters" in the market for securities and 
generally.
CHAPTER IV
INVESTMENT VALUATION AND PORTFOLIO SELECTION
1. Introduction 
We have established the nature of investor expecta­
tions as involving subjective probability distributions 
over future sets of events, the envisioned possible 
future monetary gains and losses on securities in which 
commitments of funds are considered. An investor's 
reaction to these possible outcomes is reflected in his 
utility function for cashable wealth which, as we have 
shown, provides a personalistic evaluation of the uncer­
tainty inherent in investing (or betting) decisions.
The processes of Investment valuation and portfolio 
selection by which an individual will allocate the 
current monetary equivalent of those investment assets 
which currently comprise his wealth among alternative 
security investments may now be demonstrated.
2. The Expected Utility of 
Alternative Investments 
Suppose an individual considers an investment I in 
a specific security S. He attaches subjective probability 
weights to the possible future monetary values of this 
commitment in S. Given a current (or appraised) price
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(or set of prices) of S, the probability weights of 
expected gains and losses on the investment follow by 
inference. Such ex ante monetary gains and losses may be 
supposed to have utility expressions. Accordingly, let 
U(x) represent the utility measure attaching to the 
appraised probable monetary gains and losses (x) on an 
investment I in some number i of a given security S, the 
investor’s appraisal of ex ante gains and losses on 
which is given by the probability density function 
fs(x; E, E2, E3, E4, ..., En ).
The probabilistic prospect of monetary gains in 
wealth may be supposed to represent some positive utility 
to the Investor. On the other hand, the probabilistic 
prospect of monetary losses in wealth may be supposed to 
represent some disutility to the investor. Generally, the 
appraised investment prospect may be supposed to have a 
net utility representation, Un , which combines the positive 
utilities of expected gain outcomes and the disutilities 
_of expected loss outcomes on the investment, weighted by 
their respective case probabilities:
Un = U(x)fs(x; iE, i2E2, i3E3, i4E^, ..., lnEn )dx.
Now, IJn relates to the end of the investment period 
or horizon. It is required therefore that this measure 
ke discounted to obtain the present net expected utility 
of alternative investment commitments. If the Investor 
is indifferent between the utility measure 1 now and the
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utility measure (1+r) at the end of the investment 
horizon, the present utility to the investor of the net 
expected utility of the investment under consideration 
is given by
The present net expected utility Up of alternative 
investment commitments in S (and R, T, N) may be
similarly computed. Given the general specification of 
the investor's utility of wealth function as concave 
(from below) for significant loss outcomes, and first 
convex and then concave for significant gain outcomes, 
specification of present net expected utility Up for 
alternative commitments in S (that is, as a function of 
I) depends upon fg(x; E, E2, E^, E^, ..., En). For 
concreteness, assume that an investor expects with 
relative certainty a substantial rise in the price of 
security S over the investment planning period (that is, 
attaching moderate variance and moderate positive skew­
ness to the probability distribution of ex ante gains and 
losses on the security). The present net expected utility 
°f one such security S will be positive and increase at 
an increasing rate over some relevant (initial) range 
as I Increases, reflecting the increasing variance and 
positive skewness of I over the range of U(x) exhibiting 
rising marginal utility of wealth. As larger and larger
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commitments in S are considered, however, the increasing 
disutility of ex ante losses on the investment and the 
decreasing marginal utility of ex ante gains on the 
investment may be supposed to mitigate the rise in 
net expected utility (and therefore in present net 
expected utility) of investments in S. After increasing 
at an increasing rate over some initial range of I, Up 
increases at a decreasing rate over some range of I, 
reaches a maximum, and falls. The preceding arguments 
are summarized geometrically in Figure 4-1, with the 
investment commitment in S associated with a maximum 
total utility to the investor designated I*.
3. Investment Valuation and Portfolio Selection
Generally, if present net expected utility (Up ) is 
negative for all levels of I considered, the security in 
question will be dropped from additional consideration.
An investor will require to select from among those re­
maining securities for which Up > 0 for some levels of I. 
He will do so in a fashion consistent with the objective 
of expected utility maximization.




where I denotes the monetary investment in some security 
currently under consideration. To maximize the sum of the
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INVESTMENT
Figure 1|— 1. The Present Wet Expected Utility to an 
Investor of Alternative Investment Commitments 
in a Given (Appraised) Security.
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present net expected utilities of his investment 
holdings, an investor will appraise the marginal present 
net expected utility m for each of the set of remaining 
securities for some initial small increment of invest­
ment. He will allocate the increment to the security
under consideration with the highest (positive) marginal 
present net expected utility. This process Is then 
continued until either:
(a) the marginal present net expected utili­
ties for all eligible securities are zero. At
this point the sum of the present net expected 
utilities is at a maximum, and the commitment of 
funds to securities will cease. If investible 
funds remain, the utility to the Investor of 
holding this amount of "speculative” cash is 
greater than that obtainable through its commit­
ment to the purchase of any available security;
or
(b) the investor’s wealth is fully committed 
to securities and
mA ~ mB == • • • = mN
for securities A, B, N, the marginal present
net expected utilities of the appraised securities 
1are equal. At this theoretical point of equilibrium,
1The actual indivisibility, or "lumpiness," of securi­
ties as units of investment may prevent strict equality 
between the terms. Also, the investor may decide, as the
no further changes in the investor’s portfolio will 
increase his present utility.
If there are few eligible securities (that is, if 
mg > 0 for few securities), as might be the case if the 
investor expected a general market decline or possessed 
an unusually high personal discount rate, the investor 
would hold most of his wealth in cash or money substi­
tutes. On the other hand, if there are many securities 
with positive marginal present net expected utilities, 
the individual’s wealth may be fully committed to some 
combination of securities, or even to a single security 
for which the investor's expectations are especially 
bright. In any case, the Investment valuations of persons 
are determined as preferences for strictly limited quanti­
ties of given securities at current (or appraised) prices 
and (perhaps) for a specific residual of cash or money- 
substitutes. The individual's portfolio of security 
Investments is determined and its selection may proceed 
in the market: new securities may be added; current 
holdings may be increased or decreased. But in every case 
the consequence of valuation is the determination of the 
investor's market inclinations in respect of given
allocation process proceeds, to buy two or more blocks of 
the same security. The order of allocation may be 100 
shares of A common, 100 of B, 50 more of A, and so on.
Only the strictly marginal purchase of A appears in the 
term for A above. See James W. Angell, "Uncertainty, 
Likelihoods and Investment Decisions," Quarterly Journal 
of Economics. LXXIV, No. 1 (February, 1966J", 26-211
8iJ>
securities: to buy, to sell, or to hold strictly 
determined quantities at current or appraised prices.
A Note on the Rationality of Investor Choices
The extent to which the use of mathematical notions 
has been convenient in the development of our topic makes 
it propitious that we note explicitly the inherent 
rationality of human thought and action, specifically
in the process of choice among alternative Investment
2actions. An investor, we have said, will require to 
form reasoned expectations of the potentials of alterna­
tive investment commitments. These he will evaluate in 
the light of his utility for uncertain monetary pros­
pects. As antecedent processes, he may enter into the 
most elaborate retrospective, contemporary, and future 
calculations. He may, but he need not. He is not 
obliged to go through the lengthy processes of searching 
for alternative actions, of building up his knowledge of 
facts and relationships, of carefully appraising and 
evaluating each alternative before making his selections 
and committing his resources. For to do so involves
^While the term "rationality" is used with varying 
references, we adopt a view of rationality as a general 
quality of human action and "regard all failures of actions 
to attain expected ends as a result of lack of knowlege, 
unforeseen events, conflicts of ends, and the like, each 
open to further analysis." Raymond J. Chambers, Accounting, 
Evaluation and Economic Behavior (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.T 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), p. ^6. "Human action is 
necessarily always rational." Ludwig von Mises, Human 
Action (3d. rev. ed.; Chicago: Henry Regnery Company,1966), p. 18.
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sacrifices, generally of time and effort, and often 
specifically of other valued considerations, which he 
may consider greater than the increased effectiveness of 
choice he expects as a result of doing so. And in every 
case the function of knowledge and of reasoning is not to 
increase the rationality of action, but to increase the 
effectiveness of choice; to increase the accuracy with 
which probabilities are assessed and ascribed to the 
ranges of possible consequences of alternative courses 
of action; to Increase an actor’s opportunity for optimal 
choice and adaptation.
In particular, if an investor chooses among alterna­
tive securities on the basis of some random or mechanical 
process, he is no less rational than another who chooses 
only after the most lengthy deliberation. A random 
selection entails two things: that the investing actor 
is saved delay in taking action and that his expectations 
of alternative courses of action in the then state of his 
knowledge do not warrant the effort of his choosing by 
other means.^
Moreover, we have argued that valuation inevitably 
contemplates the future, that security valuation is sub­
jective and personal, that the criteria for choosing 
among alternative security Investments are all hypotheti- 
cals arising from expectations and personal utilities.
Now, it may be argued that choice may utilize objective 1
3Ibid., pp. ^5-^6.
criteria that are able to be measured. For example, 
among alternative common shares one may choose that 
which sells currently at the least present price to 
present earnings multiple, that which has the highest 
rate of price growth, or still other criteria which may 
be measured and are matters of fact. But this notion is 
clearly mistaken. Present criteria of choice simply 
represent a subtle mode of anticipation. They assume 
that the current state of affairs will extend into the
h,future.
Additionally, one may conceive of the "value” of 
a security (or firm) as eventually capable of objective 
measurement and, hence, of "verification,” when the firm 
has paid its last dividend and the last share has been 
t r a d e d .^ This notion is mistaken on three important 
grounds. First, it neglects the fact that valuation is 
a personal process. To say that, over its life, a 
security earned so many dollars is to comment objectively 
on what it earned. It is, however, no comment at all
^This is, of course, the famous Keynesian "conven­
tion” of "assuming that the existing state of affairs 
will continue indefinitely, except as we have specific 
reasons to expect a change.” John Maynard Keynes, The 
General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money 
(New York: Earcourt, Brace and Company, 193&), P. 152.
•^''Concerning [a stock's] true worth...time only 
will tell. Time will not give its answer all at once, 
though, but only slowly, word by word, as the years go 
by; nor will the last word be spoken till the corporation 
shall have closed its books for ever and ever."
John Burr Williams, The Theory of Investment Value 
(Boston: Harvard University Press, 1938), p. 1i.
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as to Its worth. Value does not exist apart from the 
private utility of a personal referent, ah actor who acts 
or contemplates action in respect of a security (or firm). 
Value therefore exists only in the contemplation of what 
a firm or security will earn.
Secondly, it will be recalled that valuation is 
essentially a present process. Valuations are conceived 
in a given context at a given moment in respect of an 
appraised future. One may not know with certainty the 
cash flow a firm or security will generate or the manner 
in which those flows will be distributed through time.
The effect of uncertainty notwithstanding, one’s time 
preference for money will influence one’s present 
valuation of future dollars, and as this structure of 
time preferences for money may be supposed to vary inter- 
personally at a given moment and lntrapersonally through 
time, the value of a given (assumed certain) stream of 
money will likewise vary.
Thirdly and conclusively, expectations of monetary 
gains and losses on securities can be held only with 
greater or lesser degrees of probability, never with 
certainty. The likelihoods with which expected gains and 
losses are vested will vary among persons whose knowledge 
and experience may be expected to differ and for a given 
person through time as one’s knowledge and experience 
alter. Additionally, the willingness to assume risks 
and the capacity to accomodate doubts induced by uncer­
tainty will differ for different persons and for a given 
person through time.
CHAPTER V
THE THEORY OP PRICE DETERMINATION 
IN SECURITIES MARKETS
1. Introduction 
It is significant that the investment valuations 
of persons subsist as only more or less Intensely felt 
preferences for some commitments at given current (or 
appraised) prices. Stated otherwise, security valuation, 
as a process, is Intensive and subjective, consisting in 
current preferences for holding one’s wealth in alterna­
tive forms. In Juxtaposition to the character of invest­
ment valuations as subjective and intensive, the character 
of security prices, as determined in the market by the 
interaction of supply and demand, is objective and 
extensive. We require a theory of market price determi­
nation which makes explicit the process by which security 
prices are determined and transformed in the market.
2. The Concepts of Market and 
Market Participation 
Now, one may refer to the specific complex of insti­
tutions and operations by which sellers make offerings 
and buyers make bids and through which the issue and 
exchange of securities take place as "the securities
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market." Considered in this way, the market in securities
is a subset of the market in commodities and services
generally and may itself be further subdivided. We speak,
for example, of "the stock market" and "the bond market."
But these observations in respect of markets in securities
are of a technical character only; a market is simply an
arrangement by which exchanges are facilitated; it need
1have neither specific location nor distinctive form. 
Moreover, what is described in the vernacular as "the 
market for a particular security" denotes an organiza­
tional process. To speak in this way of a process is 
metaphorical, however, for to do so is to vest the intan­
gible, even ephemeral, inclinations of interested individ­
uals to take action in respect of a homogeneous asset 
with implied physical (perhaps even static) existence. 
Nonetheless, it represents a convenience of terminology 
too great to forgo, and we shall speak hereafter without 
restraint of "the market for" a given security.
In this fashion we may speak of "the market for 
Stock S," "the market for Bond B," and the like. The 
market for Security X will be comprised of those individ­
uals who entertain effective inclinations in respect of 
Security X; of those who entertain preferences with 
respect to Security X which they are both willing and 
able (neither alone is sufficient) to uphold with or
^Raymond J. Chambers, Accounting, Evaluation and 
Economic Behavior (Englewood dliffs. N. J.: Prentice- 
SalT, Kc7; m'6), P. 67.
against offers of general purchasing power. We may 
define market participation therefore in terms of an 
individual's effective inclination to take action in 
respect of a security: to buy, to sell, or to hold.
Note that it is necessary to participation in the market 
for a security that one's inclination be at least poten­
tially effective. That is, one inclined to act in respect 
of a security must be able to uphold his Inclination with 
or against currency as a generally accepted medium of 
exchange. That a pauper values' GM above its current 
price does not place him in the market for GM common.
He is entitled to his opinion; he may express it to his 
confidants or publicly and thereby, as his opinion is 
regarded, affect the participation of others in the market 
for GM; but he cannot give it specific effect himself.
3. The Process of Market Price Determination 
The Inclination of a market participant to take 
action in respect of a security derives from his sub­
jective valuations. The differing valuations of partici­
pants in the market for a specific security then determine 
the price at which any trade occurs, It follows that 
all prices are outcomes of individuals preferring a to 
b, of market participants choosing at a definite time 
and place under definite conditions between a strictly 
limited quantity of some given security and a strictly 
limited quantity of some other security or of
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dollars.2 Now, in an occasional act of barter, or the 
direct exchange of securities for securities, the ratio 
of exchange is only broadly determined. All that one is 
able to assert with regard to such exchanges is that they 
can be effected only if each participant to the exchange 
values what he receives more highly than what he sacri­
fices. But the existence of money as a generally accepted 
medium of exchange and unit of account in which exchange 
ratios are measured provides the basis of indirect exchange 
which divides transactions into two different parts: sale 
and purchase. Each party to a transaction attaches a 
higher value to what he purchases them to what he sells, 
to what he receives them to what he gives up. It follows 
that all prices are the product of a discrepemcy in valua­
tion, not the product of em equality of valuation.3 If 
the seller of so memy securities did not value so much
"The valuations and choices that result in the 
exchange ratios of the market do not decide between gold 
and iron. Acting man is not in a position in which niT 
must choose between all the gold and all the iron. He 
chooses at a definite time and place under definite con­
ditions between a strictly limited quantity of gold and 
a strictly limited quantity of iron." Ludwig von Mises, 
Human Action (3d rev. ed.; Chicago: Henry Regnery Company,
1966), p. 121.
3"The general principle underlying exchange is that 
for exchange to occur, two or more individuals must place 
different relative valuations on the goods Involved." 
Richard H. Leftwich, The Price System and Resource Allo­
cation (3d ed.; New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
Inc., 1966), p. 58; "The basis of modern economics is 
the cognition that it is precisely the disparity in the 
value attached to the objects exchanged that results in 
their being exchanged." von Mises, 0£. cit., p. 204.
money (for Itself or as a means to other purchases) more 
highly than so many securities, he would not engage in 
the transaction; if the purchaser of the securities
(seller of so much money) did not value so many securi-
L.ties more highly than so much money, he would not.
The recurrence of acts of exchange and the increase 
in the number of participants making bids and offers in 
the market narrow the margins between the valuations of 
parties. Indirect exchange, together with the (practi­
cally) unlimited divisibility of money, then makes it 
possible to establish the exchange ratios of securities 
with nicety as money prices determined between extremely 
narrow margins: "the valuations on the one hand of the 
marginal buyer and those of the marginal offerror who 
abstains from selling, and the valuations on the other 
hand of the marginal seller and those of the marginal 
potential buyer who abstains from b u y i n g . B u t  the 
valuations of persons, we have said, are transient, 
continually altering as information is received and inter­
preted. As expectations and valuations change, the
fa"A very common mistake on the part of many people 
is to think that one of the parties to a voluntary trans­
action gains while the other loses. In any voluntary 
exchange of goods among individuals, all parties to the 
exchange increase their satisfaction. It is the prospect 
of gain that causes voluntary exchange to occur."
Leftwich, op. olt., p. 57; "...if cost is value there is 
no explanation of why an event should be desired." 
Chambers, 0£. olt., p. 73.
5von Mises, 0£. olt., p. 327.
9^
eagerness of persons to buy or to sell, or to refrain 
from buying or selling, Is affected, bids and offers alter, 
transactions occur, and prices change. Rising and falling 
markets reflect widespread changing valuations, with heavy 
volume indicative of large amounts of "switching" trans­
actions as investors switch out of owned securities or 
cash and into others or cash.^
k. Prices as Measurements
Whereas valuations arise from the anticipations and 
utilities of individuals and are subjective and intensive, 
prices arise from the interaction of supply and demand in 
the market and are objective and extensive. Prices and 
changes in prices derive from the interactions of the 
judgments of all buyers and sellers for a security.
Whether one buys or not, prices are objective measure­
ments.? They measure at a given time and place the 
number of monetary units which could have been substituted 
for the quantity of specific securities-to which they are 
assigned. But the price of a share says nothing very 
precise about the personal evaluations of a share by any 
individual investor. An actual price merely expresses
^R. G. E. Smith, "The ’Marginal Opinion' Theory of 
Stock Price," Financial Analysts Journal, 23» No. 6 
(November-Deeember, 196?), 130; John Burr Williams, The 
Theory of Investment Value (Boston: Harvard University 
Press, T?3^T7~PPTT7-^
nfCf. von Mises: "...prices are not measured in 
money; they consist in money." Og. olt., p. 217.
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the fact that a buyer is, or was, willing to forgo title 
to so much money, and a seller is, or was, willing to 
forgo title to so many securities at the stated ratio 
or price. An actual price is not necessarily the 
minimum which the seller would accept or the maximum
Qwhich the buyer would be prepared to pay.
Nor does a past or present price say anything 
directly valid about the price or prices at which a 
security will trade at any point in the future. As an 
actual price is the resultant of conditions of supply and 
demand in the market at a given point of time, all prices 
require to be dated. Actual prices are past and present; 
future prices, however, are hypotheticals. One may 
utilize past and present prices and rates of change in 
prices in the development of reasoned expectations about 
future prices, but future prices are not themselves 
capable of measurement.9 One may know beyond any doubt 
a past or present price; one may only speculate as to 
a future price.
It follows from the character of any price as the 
resultant of mass causes in a given context that there 
can be no justification for assuming that an actual price
®Cf. above, pp. 91-93*
9"...never do we say that we are measuring the value 
of a quantity at a future time, even though it may be 
possible to predict that value on the basis of a measure­
ment made at present." Henry Margenau, The Nature of 
Physical Reality (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 
1959), P. 37*K
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is not a "normal" or "true" price. A man may conceive 
of the value of a security to himself; he may conceive 
of a (hypothetical) price at which he expects a security 
to sell at some future time; however, he may not conceive 
of a "normal" or "true" price for the security. There
are no other prices than those yielded by the market,
10however thick or thin, perfect or Imperfect.
5. An^Imaginary Construction of the Market
It is possible (and fashionable) to visualize the
interaction of valuations in the market by which price is
determined by drawing demand and supply curves, whose
intersection shows the equilibrium or market-clearing
11price. Elsewhere we have suggested (following 
12Williams) that market participants entertain notions 
of appraised (hypothetical) prices at which they will 
buy or sell shares.1-̂ At any moment, then, the extant
on the _ jrowth of the interplay
of the forces operating, that is, demand and supply. 
Whatever the market situation which generated this price 
may be, with regard to it the price is always adequate, 
genuine, and real. It cannot be higher if no bidder 
ready to offer a higher price turns up, and it cannot be 
lower if no seller ready to deliver at a lower price 
turns up. Only the appearance of such people ready to buy 
or to sell can alter prices." von Mises, o|>. olt., p. 396.
^Smith, 0£. olt., pp. 127-132.
12Williams, o£. olt., Chp. 3*
*^a vast literature ex.ists-^wMch treats the methods 
of analysis by which such hypothetical "buy" and "sell" 
prices are formulated. See, generally, Donald E. Vaughn, 
Survey of Investments (New York: Holt, Rinehart and
"Any price determined
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quantity of a given security will be in the possession 
of certain people (owners). Other people (also market 
participants) have preferences for definite quantities 
at definite prices. We can therefore draw the usual 
downward sloping demand curve which shows the readiness 
of buyers to take various quantities at various hypo­
thetical prices. Ordinarily this demand curve would be 
met in the market by an upward-sloping supply curve of 
the potential sellers of a product. The situation in the 
market will thus determine the price by the intersection 
of the downward-sloping demand curve on the one hand with 
the upward-sloping supply curve on the other.
The traditional upward slope of the market supply 
curve derives from the economic theory of production and
ikcosts. In the case of non-reproducible goods (that is,
those goods fixed in supply), the forces determining the
shape of the owners' (sellers') supply curve are the same
as those which determine the shape of the buyers' demand 
15curve. Buyers decide whether to buy the shares in
Winston, Inc., 1967); for a detailed presentation of the 
methods of technical analysis, see Robert D. Edwards and 
John Magee, Technical Analysis of Stock Trends (Spring­
field, Mass.: John Magee, 1964); of fundamental analysis, 
see Benjamin Graham, David L. Dodd, and Sidney Cottle, 
Security Analysis (4th ed.; New York: McGraw-Hill Book 
C6 .7 196217^ ----
■^See, for example, Leftwlch, op. olt., Chps. 7» 8,
and 9.
■^The usefulness of the subjectival dichotomy of 
"demand" and "supply" depends upon the "empirical 
generalization that an enumeration of the forces affecting 
demand in any problem and of the forces affecting supply
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question or other shares or goods or simply to hold their 
money. In the same way, owners (potential sellers) 
decide whether to hold their shares or to exchange them 
for money to hold or as a means to the purchase of other 
shares or goods more highly valued.^ The willingness 
or reluctance of securityholders to buy or to sell is 
therefore determined by the owners* (sellers*) demand for 
their own security holdings.
The existent shares (say) of a given firm are 
owned and held by Investors. The willingness of holders 
to sell owned shares is determined by the same processes 
of appaisement and valuation as the eagerness of non­
will yield two lists that contain few items in common." 
Milton Friedman, "The Marshallian Demand Curve," Journal 
of Political Economy, LVII, No. 6 (December, 19^9)» 468. 
"Now this generalization is valid for markets like.the 
final market for a consumer good. In such a market there 
is a clear and sharp distinction between the economic 
units that can be regarded as demanding the product and 
those that can be regarded as supplying it.... But the 
generalization is not always valid. For example, it is 
not valid for the day-to-day fluctuations of prices in a 
primarily speculative market. Is a rumor of an increased 
excess-profits tax, for example, to be regarded as a fac­
tor operating primarily on today’s supply of corporate 
equities in the stock market or on today’s demand for 
them,? In similar fashion, almost every factor can with, 
about as much justification be classified under the head­
ing ’supply* as under the heading ’demand.'" Milton 
Friedman, Essays in Positive Economics (Chicago: The Uni­
versity of Chicago Press, 1953)* P» 8. Hicks properly 
observes that the indifference curve approach he uses to 
analyze consumer choice is suitable for describing an in­
vestor’s tastes only if his expectations of future prices 
are independent of present prices. Only in the unlikely 
event that people ignore the present prices of securities 
in shaping their expectations of future prices will this 
condition be satisfied. See J. R. Hicks, Value and 
Capital (2d ed.; London: Oxford Univ. Press, 19^6)» p. 56.
l?See above, Chp. IV.
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owners to buy and possess given quantities of shares.
One may suppose, if one chooses, that holders actually 
offer their shares for sale in the market, but "buy them 
back" at their "reserve" prices. A decision to sell can 
then be expressed as a decision "not to demand." It is 
therefore possible and legitimate to represent the supply 
conditions of a good whose supply is fixed not only by 
an upward-sloping supply curve, but alternatively, by 
a downward-sloping demand curve of securityholders' 
for their own shares.1® In Figure 5-1(a) there is a 
fixed supply OQ of a given security. Supply conditions 
are represented by a downward-sloping demand curve of - 
securityholders for their own securities, denoted SOD.
In Figure 5-1 (t>) the securityholders' demand curve for 
their own securities (SOD) is added horizontally to the 
usual downward-sloping demand curve of buyers, denoted DD. 
The curve resulting from the horizontal summation of 
DD and SOD constitutes the demand curve of the market as 
a whole for the security in point, the broken curve DE. 
This "total" demand curve is confronted in the market
18«gvery share of stock demanded can be bought at 
some price; every share of stock offered can be sold at 
some price. It is merely a continuous auction sale, but 
one in which both buyers and sellers are bidding. In the 
usual auction of goods, only the buyers bid for what is 
offered, which is then sold to the highest bidder. In the
stock exchange auotion, buyers are bidding but so are
sellers (by offering to sell at a certain reserve price). 
The price, of an actual transaction recorded on the ticker
tape is that at which a seller was willing to sell and a
buyer was willing to buy." Edgar S. Genstein, Stock Market 
Profit without Forecasting (Larohmont, New York: American 
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Figure 5-1* (a-) The Demand of Present Holders for a Given Security: Security­
holders Own Demand; (b) An Imaginary Construction of the Market for a 
Security and of Security Price Determination.
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with the vertical curve QQ, representing the fired supply 
of the security in existence. Price is determined by the 
interaction of the combined demand curve DE with the 
curve of fixed supply QQ; MP in Figure 5-1 (*>). The 
number of securities bought and sold (transaction volume) 
is 0M, and the number of securities not sold is MQ. It 
will be apparent from Figure 5-1 (t>) that when the price 
of a security moves, it moves because of a shift in the 
market demand curve for that security. Such a shift 
represents changes occurring in the expectations and 
valuations of owners and non-owners (but effective market 
participants) and in the hypothetical prices at which they 
would buy and sell certain quantities of the security in
question.
It is, of course, no less possible (and fashionable) 
to describe the market mathematically. It will be 
apparent, however, that mathematical or pictorial modes 
of expression "do not affect the essence of our interpre-
20tation and that they do not add one whit to our insight."
^"But what of the * supply curve' that usually 
figures as a determinant of price, co-ordinate with the 
demand curve? I say it boldly and baldly: There is no 
such thing. When we are speaking of a marketable commod­
ity, what is usually called the supply curve is in reality 
the demand curve of those who possess the commodity....
The so-called supply curve, therefore, is simply a part 
of the total demand curve...." Philip H. Wlcksteed, "The 
Scope and Method of Political Economy," The Economic Jour­
nal, XXIV (March, 1 9 1 M » p. 13. See also Smith, loo, olt.; 
and Williams, loc. cit.
^®von Mises, o£. cit., p. 333.
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Furthermore, It Is possible for these "models" to mis­
lead. They Inevitably rest upon simplifying assumptions 
which may or may not be made explicit. They may prove 
expedient in helping undergraduates to visualize the 
market, but their significance otherwise is trivial.
6. The Market as a * Black Box'
We have viewed the market for a security as being 
comprised of individuals who entertain effective inclina­
tions to act in the present in respect of that security, 
guided by their differing appraisals and valuations which 
are only more or less intensely felt and are continually 
being transformed. The practical complexity of market 
systems is therefore immense. The daily transactions 
in the market for many securities are thousandfold; the 
perceptions, interpretations, and valuations proximate to 
any one of them may be many millions. As a consequence, 
it is almost, if not completely, impossible to visualize 
the whole of the processes which contribute to a single 
transaction in the market. This complexity of the market 
as an action system requires that it be regarded as a 
"black box." It is definable in principle, but the very 
complexity of it defies definition in practice. We can 
know, in principle, what is going on "in there” but we 
cannot observe it or test it. Only the consequences of 
all those thousands of decisions which contribute to a 
single transaction are capable of measurement and observa­
tion: (dated) prices and volume. Data as to transaction
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volume and prices In any Interval are to be regarded as 
the output of a "black box."
Moreover, we have noted above the nature of an 
actual price as indicative of nothing very precise about 
the personal evaluations of a security by only variously 
informed participants in the market. An actual price, 
we have said, merely expresses that an individual was 
willing to forgo title to so many securities for so much 
money and another Individual was willing to forgo title 
to so much money in exchange for so many securities.
The purchaser evidently valued so many securities more 
highly than so much money; the seller, so much money 
more highly than so many securities. But in neither 
case are we able to deduce how much is "more." We are 
not able to specify the shape of the market demand curve 
for a security. We are only able to conclude that 
owners value their holdings above the current price or 
bid; non-owners (but effective market participants), 
below the current price or asked quotation. Only when 
the effective valuations of owners and non-owners 
"overlapn can a trade occur. But we can have no know­
ledge or experience concerning the shape of market 
curves. Always what we know are (dated) market prices 
and trading quantities— not the curves, but only a point 
which we may interpret (if we like) as the intersection 
of two hypothetical curves. But the curves do not 
exist.
7. Inputs of Securities Markets
We have spoken above of prices and transaction 
volume as the output data of market systems. We may 
regard the input data of markets as the informative 
stimuli which induce and alter the differing expectations 
and valuations of investing persons which interact in the 
market to form prices. The task of predicting future 
market prices reduces to the task of anticipating the 
relevant news (financial and otherwise) and of appraising 
its composite effect upon the market for a specific 
security. If Investors are to choose other than randomly, 
they will require to study the forces at work in the past 
and present in those areas considered relevant to their 
choice (earnings trends, price trends and configurations, 
social, political, and economic forces, for instance) and, 
in the light of correlations established in one's experi­
ence or of logical relationships justified in one's 
reason, to form reasoned expectations which guide actions.
Now, market participants are of varying wills and 
capacities. Information bearing on the prospects of 
specific securities is only variously received and vicari­
ously interpreted by participants in the market for those 
securities. Always the market for a security Includes
21a "way to forecast the news, and thus...the move­
ment of prices, is to study the forces at work, in the 
belief that 'coming events cast their shadows before.'
In this spirit of prophecy Keynes wrote his Economic 
Consequences of the Peace." Williams, o£. cit., p. 35.
participants who are more and less informed. Moreover, 
it always includes among its members some persons who are 
more readily able to interpret and to act upon informa­
tion. Those more informed and more capable participants,
though few in number, may be said to "see the truth 
22first." Insofar as an item of news is received and 
accorded varying significances for the future and thereby 
has divergent effects upon the valuations of market 
participants, the same Information may induce differing 
responses in market participants, different inclinations 
to action in respect of a security. The effects of such 
messages generally will be toward a maintenance of current 
conditions in the market, or an equilibrium of price 
through time, styled a consolidation. This tendency to 
equilibrium is upset to the extent and in the direction 
that messages induce similar responses throughout the 
market for a security, or throughout the market in the 
securities of firms generally. But even in the case of 
news which may be expected to receive general assent 
throughout the market as "good" or "bad," substantial 
price changes do not occur instantaneously, but only over 
some period of time during which the news is thoroughly 
disseminated among, and similarly interpreted by, numerous 
investors, if the news is "good," those who receive and
22"Every speculator's life is strewn with regrets, 
vain regrets for the news he did not understand until it was too late." Ibid., p. 37.
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understand it first buy from marginal owners who do not 
know enough at the time to change their standing offers 
or to refrain from selling as they see the price of the 
security move upward. If the news is "bad," those alert 
enough to see it first take advantage this time of 
standing bids in the market and of those owners who 
abstain from selling as they see the price of the 
security move downward. ^
Now, we have heretofore conceived of the market in 
securities generally as comprised of many separate mar­
kets in the specific securities of firms, each comprised 
of participants who entertain effective inclinations to 
action in respect of a particular security at a given 
time. We have emphasized especially the ephemeral 
character of markets. As informative stimuli continually 
effect changes in expectations and valuations, 
the participations of persons in the separate markets 
for specific securities may alter, with the same 
information having its (practically) simultaneous 
effect in all markets. An investor may, for example, 
on news interpreted as favorable to GM relative to Tele­
phone, decide to switch out of Telephone at a (given) 
current price (bid) and into GM at a (given) current 
price (offer), the net effect, other things equal, being 
upward pressure on the price of GM and downward pressure
23williams, 0£. cit., pp. 36-37.
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on the price of Telephone. That investor participations 
in the markets for specific securities are mobile and 
that investor valuations are transient produces a general 
connexlty of securities markets and an integrated struc­
ture of securities prices. It is therefore patently 
absurd to look upon a definite security price as though 
it were an isolated phenomenon. What is called a price 
is an instantaneous quantitative ratio expressive of a 
relationship within an integrated system which is the
composite effect of the current valuations of all
oh.investing persons.
This general connexity of markets and of prices 
is not limited to securities markets and prices; it is 
characteristic of speculative markets generally. For 
example, the markets for steel scrap (or titles to steel 
scrap) and steel shares tend to turn up at the same 
time, for the same news is, in general, relevant to both 
markets. As the same news is generally available to 
stock traders and scrap dealers, they may be supposed 
ordinarily to decide at the same time that steel 
operations are going to increase or decrease. Moreover, 
members of either group are free to trade in the other’s 
market if excess differentials should exist between the 
two. It is therefore not to be expected that scrap prices 
should move in advance of share prices. We could variously 
restate the preceding argument in terms of the markets for
2^von Mises, 0£. cit., p. 392.
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crude and oil shares, for Interest rates and bank shaires, 
or for any set of related speculative markets and for the 
structure of speculative prices generally. The same news 
Is reflected at (practically) the same time In all markets; 
It is therefore inconceivable that any general scheme 
could be devised for forecasting price movements in one 
speculative market by the prior price movements of some 
other speculative market.2 5
Generally, the output data of market systems 
(I.e., market prices) are themselves important inputs 
of markets. As past and present prices are a significant 
foundation for expected prices and as knowledge of present 
prices and bids is antecedent to the calculation of one's 
cashable wealth as an indication of one's capacity for 
action as at a moment in time and as an indication of the 
effectiveness of one's aotions through time, a significant 
function of the securities market is to inform buyers 
and sellers of the current structure of securities 
prices. But to regard the market simply as a device by 
which buyers and sellers are. informed and actual exchanges 
are effected would be to understate its functions and to 
ignore its social character.
8. Security Prices as Social Phenomena 
Notice particularly that security prices are social . 
phenomena arising from the interplay of the differing
25williams, ££. olt., pp. 39-^1
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expectations and valuations of all individuals partici­
pating in the operation of the market. Each individual, 
in buying or not buying, in selling or not selling, 
thereby contributes his share to the formation of the 
market prices of securities.^ The larger the market, 
in any case, the smaller is the weight of each individ­
ual's contribution, the greater the effectiveness and 
efficiency with which the market may be expected to 
perform its associative and informative functions.
But always the forces determining the state of the market 
in securities generally, the price structure of securi­
ties at any instant, are the value judgments of individ­
uals and their actions as directed by their current 
expectations and preferences. There is nothing inhuman 
or mystical about the market for a specific security or 
in securities generally. The market process is entirely 
and without exception a resultant of human choices and
2^Smith, 0£. olt., p. 129.
2?Though we speak of the market for a security as 
Including all the individuals who entertain effective 
inclinations to action in respect of a security and of 
the market price of a security as the outcome of the 
valuations of all investing persons, it will be clear 
that the technical character of market organizations 
places real restrictions upon the efficiency with which 
the contributions of investors to price formation oan be 
made. Hence, it may happen at certain times that prices 
do not reflect the immediate inclinations of all persons. 
During a sudden liquidation or immediately following 
the receipt of startling news, for example, prices for 
a few hours or a day may reflect a (technically) 
restricted group of buyers and sellers. See Williams,
0£. cit., pp. 37-39.
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actions.2® The market is a social body; market phenomena 
are social phenomena, the resultant of each individual's 
passive or active contribution. But they are at one and 
the same time different from each such contribution.
They appear to the Individual as something given, which 
he himself cannot alter. He therefore may not always 
see himself as a significant, or even small, part of the 
complex; of elements determining each momentary state of 
the market.29 He may therefore feel himself free to 
criticize "the market" or "Wall Street" or to speak of 
"fair" prices, but these are absurd contradictions to the 
concept of a. market.30
28«it is customary to speak metaphorically of the 
automatic and anonymous forces actuating the 'mechanism' 
of the market. In employing such metaphors people are 
ready to disregard the fact that the only factors directing 
the market and the determination of prices are purposive 
acts of men. There is no automism; there are only men 
consciously and deliberately aiming at ends chosen. There 
are no mysterious mechanical forces; there is only the 
human will to remove uneasiness. There is no anonymity; 
there is I and you and Bill and Joe and all the rest." 
von Mises, ojd. cit., p. 315* "*The Market* is not a mys­
terious entity in itself, rising and falling alone. Its 
price fluctuations result from the actions of a great many 
human beings, motivated by their own personal knowledge, 
emotions, and opinions." Garfield A. Drew, New Methods
for Profit in the Stock Market (Boston: The MetcalfPress, '194877 p. 169.
29von Mises, loc. cit.
3°"The concept of a 'Just* or 'fair' price is devoid 
of any scientific meaning; it is a disguise for wishes, a 
striving for a state of affairs different from reality. 
Market prices are entirely determined by the value judg­
ments of men as they really act." von Mises, 0£. cit., 
p. 332. Magee ably dispels the myth of "the Street" and 
"They" in John Magee, The General Semantics of Wall Street
(Springfield, Mass.: John Magee, 1958), pp. 1^37^7 *32 f.
It follows from the social character of market phe­
nomena that movements In specific prices, or in prices 
generally, are not to be regarded as randomly generated:
In every case, the price and quantity of a dated trans­
action in securities are the result of specific individ­
uals preferring a to b at a given time and in a given 
context, a strictly limited quantity of money to a 
strictly limited number of securities and vice-versa.
Those who would suggest that securities prices fluctuate 
randomly fail to understand one of the most significant 
functions that securities markets perform: that of a 
signalling device. They fail to understand the homeo­
static character of market systems. For we have said 
that when we speak of prices tending to rise or to fall, 
we do not refer to an impersonal and automatic mechanism; 
we refer to the responses of rational persons to stimuli 
which include information concerning prevailing market 
prices. Such responses are not to be regarded as auto­
matic ones. They proceed from the (subjective) expecta­
tions (and valuations) of thoughtful persons, based at 
least in part upon imperfect information. As choices are 
directed towards the future and as there is always some 
uncertainty regarding the future, there always exists the 
possibility that expectations may be disappointed. If and 
insofar as those expectations which are the bases of 
action in some interval are proved to have been in error 
in succeeding intervals, the signals of the market may be
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supposed to induce canceling and corrective responses in 
market participants. On the market agitation never stops 
as prices continually adjust to current expectations and 
current valuations which are no less entirely anticipa­
tory but which represent always the most current antici­
pations and valuations of all Investing persons. Any 
market with its price mechanism may therefore be regarded 
as a homeostatic device, continually restoring to con­
sistency with actual conditions and events any price 
which may have diverged from consistency through error 
or mistaken expectations. The viability of the market 
system is thereby maintained.-̂ 1
9. Securities Prices and Management J
We have considered the corporation as an entity 
operated in the interest of securityholders by managers.
It is frequently argued that the remoteness of individual 
holders from the operations of complex corporations has 
created a general independence of corporate managements.
It is further argued that managements are therefore able 
to free themselves of the pricing system of the securities 
markets. And this may perhaps be true, but only to the 
extent that imperfect competition in the product or factor 
markets of firms will allow. For unless the performance
^The classic study is Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and 
Gardiner G. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property (New York: The Macmillan Company, 193271
32Chambers, op. cit., pp. 68-69; von Mises, op. olt., 
Chps. 15 and 16.
of a firm is consistent with the expectations of 
securityholders, in the light of current conditions 
and available alternatives, investors are fully able to 
cast votes of no confidence in its management by 
selling their securities (lowering offers and bids), 
running down the market prices of its securities, 
relative to those of similar firms, to a level consistent 
with their new expectations and valuations. In the case 
of shares, other firms or corporate "raiders" may then 
buy up the stock of the delinquent corporation, forcing 
out the incumbent management of the latter; or, dis­
appointed shareholders, often under zealous direction, 
may exercise their formal, legal authority to control, 
unseating the incumbent set of directors. Or, dissident
shareholders may take legal action to liquidate the 
33corporation. Bondholders may also sell their securi­
ties in the market, running the price of a delinquent 
firm’s bonds down and raising the costs at which the firm 
can borrow. And, if their interests are threatened, any 
creditor of the firm, however small or unsecured, may 
bring action against the corporation and, in seeking his 
remedy, compel the forced liquidation of specific assets 
or even bring about the collapse of flimsy corporations.
33»On April Pool's Day, 1932, a Mrs. Helen Samuels—  
who held a mere $2,000 of stock in Insull Utility Invest­
ments— quietly applied for the appointment of a receiver. 
Within a few short weeks...thousands of American investors 
had been ruined in the greatest financial failure in the 
history of the world." Aylmer Vallance, Very Private 
Enterprise (London: Thames and Hudson, 193577 p. i67.
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"There Is ample evidence of the effectiveness of these 
remedies; the possibility that any one of them may occur, 
to the personal detriment of the management group, Is a 
check on disregard of the market."-' That the check Is , 
operating Is attested to by the concern of managements 
and directorates for the markets in the securities of 
their firm and generally, a concern which is widely 
observable.
3^chambers, o£. clt., p. 276.
35«»There seems to be considerable evidence that, 
though the managements and directorates of corporations 
are not directly under the overt scrutiny of stockholders 
as a body in many respects they behave as if they were, 
largely because of the richness of the interrelationships 
in the market places of an interdependent society." 
Chambers, loc. clt.; "...the manager and the capital 
owner are each active in his own distinct sphere, but 
their spheres of action are interrelated by virtue of 
mutual orientation...the specifying and modifying 
decisions of the manager presuppose and are consequent 
upon the decisions of the capitalist. If we like, we 
may say that the latter*s decisions are of a ’higher 
order.*" L. M. Laohmann, Capital and Its Structure 




Tradition dictates that rigorous inquiry be 
divisible into three parts. In the first part one tells 
what it is that he intends to say; in the second part, he 
says it; and, in the third part, he tells what it is that 
he has said. This epilogue constitutes our third part.




1. At any time the individual has a fired stock of 
(net) cashable wealth which he considers eligible for 
investment;
2. The investment opportunities of persons are 
represented by risky securities and (practically) 
riskless (in money terms) cash;
3. The investment choices of persons are made in 
a given present in respect of an uncertain future;
All knowledge of the future and, therefore, of 
the future consequences of investment choices is held
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with only a greater or lesser degree of probability;
5. Investment choice and action are individual 
and here and now, involving appraisement, the anticipa­
tion of the expected consequences of available alterna­
tive investments, and valuation, the preference of an 
individual investor for the appraised consequences of 
alternatives;
6. The investment decisions of persons are made 
relevant to a short period of time, or "investment 
horizon;"
7. The (net) ex post monetary gain or loss on an 
investment is the (net) market price of the investment at 
the end of the investment horizon plus (net) periodical 
income (if any) from the investment over the horizon 
minus the (gross) purchase price of the Investment;
8. The subjective expectations (appraisements) of 
persons concerning the (net) income and capital gain 
prospects of alternative investments subsist as 
n-parameter (subjective) probability distributions
over envisioned possible future events, ex ante monetary 
gains and losses on alternative investments over 
specified investment periods;
9. The individual investor entertains probabilistic 
appraisements for a finite set of alternative investments;
10. The individual investor’s utility of wealth
^Solely for convenience, periodical income was 
treated as accruing to the end of the investment period.
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function is generally of the form specified, by 
Friedman-Savage2 and modified by M a r k o w i t z concave 
(from below) for a relevant (initial) range of wealth 
below the investor’s present wealth, convex over some 
(initial) range of wealth above present wealth to a 
level termed the individual’s "wealth aspiration," then 
concave again, but bounded in the extremes; and
11. The investor selects among alternative invest­
ments so as to maximize his present valuation of net 
expected utility.
3. Inferences
It follows from arguments (1) through (11) that 
the Individual investor’s valuations of alternative 
Investments are determined as preferences for strictly 
limited commitments in particular securities at current 
(or appraised) prices. The inclinations of investors 
to take action in respect of given securities (to buy, 
to sell, or to hold specific quantities at specific 
prices) then have effect in the market. They collectively 
determine between more or less narrow margins the price 
and quantity of each (dated) market transaction.
Whereas the differing valuations which give rise to
2Milton Friedman and L. J. Savage, "The Utility 
Analysis of Choices Involving Risk," Readings in Price 
Theory (eds. George J. Stigler and Kenneth E. Boulding; 
dhicagos Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1952), PP. 57-96.
3jlarry Markowitz, "The Utility of Wealth," Journal 
of Political Economy. IX, No. 2 (April, 1952), 151-1^8.
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market participation are subjective and Intensive, the 
market prices of securities derive from the interaction 
of the Judgments of all participants in the market and 
are objective and extensive measurements. They measure 
at a given time -and place the number of monetary units 
which could have been substituted for a given quantity 
of securities, and vice-versa. (Dated) prices and 
transaction volume alone constitute the corroborative 
data of securities markets and require to be regarded 
as the output of a "black box."
The inputs of the securities markets are informa­
tional stimuli only variously received and vicariously 
interpreted by market participants. Important Inputs 
through time of such markets are their output data: the 
past and present prices of securities as indications of 
future prices, as objective criteria by which the 
effectiveness of past investment choices may be Judged, 
and by reference to which investors may ascertain the 
current monetary equivalents of their portfolios as 
indications of their present capacities for action.
Finally and significantly, the market in securities 
is a viable social body; security prices are social 
phenomena. The forces determining the state of the 
market at any moment and thereby guiding the investment 
choices of persons and the actions and policies of manage­
ments are entirely the value Judgments of rational persons.
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Conclusion
Our aim has been the description of the essentially 
subjective and rational process by which individuals make 
Investment decisions and contribute to the determination 
of securities prices which guide the aotions of manage­
ments and the process of capital formation. Our dis­
cussion has proceeded largely at a general level, since 
no explanation of the decision-making process of the 
individual investor which is either very elaborate or 
capable of being used for purposes of prediction is 
possible. This conclusion follows from the essential 
subjectivity and impermanence of the expectations and 
valuations which lie at the basis of the Investment 
decisions of individuals.
The schedules and formulae we have found convenient 
to construct and offer as generally descriptive of the 
process by which those decisions are made are examples 
of imaginary constructions useful in exposition. There 
is, however, no implication that investors construct 
such schedules or manipulate even the simplest formulae 
antecedent to their selections. They may, but they 
need not. It is sufficient to our theory that they 
reflect on the nature of uncertainty and on the 
probabilistic character of all knowledge held in 
contemplation of the future and of the future conse­
quences of investment actions and that they hold 
expectations of the potentials of alternative Investment
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commitments which they can evaluate in the light of their 
various preferences or utilities for vicariously uncer­
tain monetary prospects.
Generally, the process of individual investment 
decision-making is neither chaotic nor limitlessly fluid. 
The individual investor may change his estimates, 
appraisements, and preferences from time to time, but 
as a rule he does so only within broad limits. The man 
who has previously been interested in municipal bonds, 
for example, is unlikely overnight to become a buyer of 
penny stocks, nor the man previously interested in 
highly speculative issues, a sudden devotee of utilities. 
But if the individual Investor does not form reasoned 
expectations of the potentials of alternative 
securities and select among alternatives according to 
his preferences, only by chance will he make choices 
appropriate to them.
Finally, we have spoken of action and, in particular, 
of Investment categories of action as individual in its 
essential character. It is not always the case, however, 
that an individual acts for himself. It is acknowledged 
that associations comprised of the funds of numerous 
individuals operate in the market for securities and that 
investment counselors are at times contracted to manage
^James W. Angell, "Uncertainty, Likelihoods and 
Investment Decisions," Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXXIV, No. 1 (February, i960), 24-25.
an investor*s portfolio. But Institutions do not act as 
such; they act only through men.^ Their singular differ­
entiation is in respect of the vast accumulations of 
wealth they are able to achieve. Investment counselors 
are likewise deliberative men. That they deliberate and 
act as agents for Investing principals requires that they 
function in the interest of one whose ends they may know 
only secondarily. They may seek in their function to 
predict the optimal adaptive decisions of their prin­
cipals, but they function as men. By agreement, their 
choice is the choice, their actions are the actions, of 
their principals.
^"The hangman, not the state, executes a criminal." 
Ludwig von Mises, Human Action (3d rev. ed.; Chicago: 
Henry Hegnery Company, l£66), p. kz.
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